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I. INTRODUCrION
Contract law has grappled with the effect a party's nonbargained for
precontractual reliance should have on the other party's ability to break
off negotiations with impunity. If the parties themselves have not
achieved an orthodoxically explicit traditional bargain,2 should the law
3
nonetheless impose liability for the reliance losses of one party?
2. Such a bargain refers to a bargain in which each party expressly names the price of her
promise. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty,Moral Hazard and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for PrecontractualNegotiations, 44 HAsMINGS L.i. 621, 623 n.1 (1993). ("Put differently,
this required linkage-bargained-for consideration-signifies a reciprocal inducement theory under
which the promisor explicitly seeks, in exchange for her promise, either some conduct or a return
promise ....").
3. "The legal question is whether S[eller] [the withdrawing party] can withdraw with no liability to B[uyerl [the relying party], or whether S[eller] has incurred some obligation to compensate
B[uyer] if she withdraws." Craswell, supra note 1, at 484. For a doctrinal treatment of precontractual liability issues, see E. Allan Farnsworth, PrecontractualLiability and PreliminaryAgreements:
FairDealing and FailedNegotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV.217 (1987). Professor Avery Katz explains
the legal question as follows: "Absent an explicit promise not to revoke, how could one reasonably
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Traditional law ignored a salient issue inherent in this precontractual
reliance debate-that of the justification for a law-supplied liability rule
where the parties fail to expressly contract to protect reliance. Because it
4
reflexively denied parties compensation for unbargained-for reliance,

liability rules; it retraditional law did not need to justify law-supplied
5

stricted liability to explicit arrangements.
More recently, under the rubric of Restatement (Second) of Con7
tracts § 90,6 courts have permitted recovery for precontractual reliance.
However, these courts have continued to obscure the issue of when and
why a law-supplied liability rule is appropriate as an adjunct to more explicit contractual arrangements. 8 Courts have resolved prebargain reliance
liability issues through assessments of current conventions: 9 for example,
the law protected prebargain reliance if convention suggested such reliance to be reasonable. 10
be inferred ... ?" Katz, supra note 1, at 1261.
4. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 623.
5. It limited protection of reliance to that which was explicitly sought and named as the price
of the exchange. See generally REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (describing requisites of bargained-for exchange).
6.
Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance. (1) A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcS § 90 (1981).
7. See generally Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE LJ. 343 (1969) (tracing expansion of section 90 and promissory estoppel to commercial contexts). But see Robert A. Hillman, The Triumph of Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 Nw.
U. L REv. 32, 39 (1995) (highlighting recent judicial reluctance to embrace promissory estoppel).
8. See infra part IV.A.
9. These conventions looked at "what most people would (or ought to) do." Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 269, 275 (1986); see also Katz, supra note
1, at 1254 ("From the interpretive perspective, reliance is reasonable if it is customarily expected
"). At one level a convention based theorist is postulating in effect
under the circumstances ....
"that the function of law is to learn to recognize, or imitate, regimes of spontaneous order already
present in social life. Thus, legal rationalization is nothing more than a means to promote the accuSee Robert W. Gordon, Historicismin Legal Scholarrate encoding of these orders of custom ....
ship, 90 YALE LJ. 1017, 1029 (1981). For a description of the ways in which such an "encoding"
approach to law is vulnerable as a method of evaluating different legal rules, see id. at 1028-37.
10. Such conventions were protected so that parties would "invest time and energy in finding
out what they [the rules] are." Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1698 (1976). For a discussion of the benefits of administering such conventions (rules), see generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging
Under the Guise of PromissoryEstoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 895, 93435 (1987); see also Katz, supra note 1, at 1251 ("convention maintenance" theory suggests retention
to "provid[e] newcomers with incentives to learn them [the conventions].") In addition, enforcement
of the convention will achieve justice, because in cases in which the "the plaintiffs should have un-
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Because convention-based theories are inherently circular and offer
no independent, objective norm for judging the conventions or for justifying the adoption of a legal rule protecting reliance when the parties did
not expressly adopt it," recent analysts of precontractual reliance liability
issues have substituted an "instrumental" approach.' 2 Under that apderstood that they were relying at their peril, courts found no injustice in failing to enforce the offers
made to them." Id. at 1264.
11. See Barnett, supra note 9, at 275. A basic problem with convention maintenance theory-as
a means of analyzing the bindingness of precontractual reliance-is that of circularity. Circularity
arises because the prevailing convention itself is affected and determined by the prevailing legal rule.
See id. One cannot determine what is reasonable (and therefore compensable) reliance without inquiring into what most people would do under similar circumstances. "We cannot make this assessment [reasonableness of reliance] independently of the legal rule in effect in the relevant community,
because what many people would do in reliance on a promise is crucially affected by their perception of whether or not the promise is enforceable." Id. Within a convention-based analysis, it is difficult to establish conventions or expectations independent of the law or to posit the best rule, thereby
"introducing a practical circularity into the analysis." Id. The other basic problem with conventionbased theory is that it offers no independent means of assessing the conventions against a normative
yardstick. See id. at 276-77. What goals should society pursue and how does a particular convention
further that goal and at what cost? See Clayton P. Gillette, Cooperation and Convention in Contractual Defaults, 3 S. CAL. INTisc. L.J. 167, 179 (1993) (suggesting the need to justify conventions
in normative terms and to "find some mechanism that transforms the convention from a mere virtue
into an obligation"); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Looking for Default Rule Legitimacy in All the Wrong
Places, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIat
s...
189, 200 (1993) (criticizing theories that fail to justify and rationalize use of conventions and which rely merely on their prevalence); see also Katz, supra note I, at
1251-52 (suggesting that the drawback of a purely conventions-based analysis is that it "cannot tell
us which legal rule is best. Different conventions for interpreting the parties' external manifestations
are possible, and the mere requirement that law accord with expectation does not justify any legal
rule in particular.").
12. An instrumental approach focuses on an identified goal, such as efficiency, and attempts to
determine which legal rule will best achieve that goal. Instrumentalism's analysis requires the decisionmaker "to make assumptions about how things (including people) behave in reality." Ronald J.
Coffey, Perspectives on Legal Methods 4 (July 6, 1990) (on file with author). Proponents of instrumentalism then compare legal rules to determine which rule is optimal, given certain projections
about human behavior. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALF .. 1261, 1266 (1980) (analyzing which "enforcement
model . . . encourages the socially optimal interaction between the promising parties"); see also
Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEG;AL STD.
1 (1978) (analyzing which disclosure rules would be optimal); Wils, supra note 1, at 93 (comparing
various rules against "well-defined normative criteria of wealth maximization and fairness"); see
generally Kostritsky, supra note 2 (suggesting efficiency rationale and optimal default rule for
precontractual bargaining after comparing various alternative private and law-supplied mechanisms
against efficiency criteria).
Instrumental analyses are, of course, subject to criticism for improperly preferring certain
goals-such as efficiency-over other goals such as fairness. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rnv. 829, 857 (1983) (highlighting "utopian contract law"
and "new structures of law and society which do not embody the elements of unfairness present in
contemporary society and contract law"). Professor Barnett also criticizes such efficiency theories for
their inability to explain "why certain commitments should be enforced unless it is further shown
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proach, legal decisionmakers evaluate different legal rules by a normative
5
yardstick, 13 such as efficiency, 14 to determine which rule will better
7
achieve a predefined goal 16 of promoting efficient behavior.
An instrumental approach should advance the analysis of precontractual liability issues by justifying liability rules and settling future precontractual liability issues by reference to projected (1) goals and (2) behavioral reactions of average parties to alternative projected rules. 8 By
comparing parties' reactions and the likely effect of alternative rules on
that economic efficiency is the exclusive goal of a legal order." Barnett, supra note 9, at 283. For a
discussion of critics of efficiency based norms, see Richard Craswell, The Relational Move: Some
Questions From Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL IrmntIsc. W. 91, 100 (1993).
13. See Barnett, supra note 9, at 277-86. Professor Barnett discusses how efficiency and other
"standards-based" theories "which evaluate the substance of a contractual transaction to see if it
conforms to a standard of evaluation that the theory specifies as primary." Id. at 277.
14. Of course, not everyone would accept that rule choices should be made based on instrumental conceptions of efficiency. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction:
Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL L. REv. 221, 247-49 (1980) (cited in
Richard Craswell, Default Rules, Efficiency, and Prudence, 3 S. CAL ITEueisc. LJ. 289, 292 n.7
(1993)); see also David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mic. L REv. 1815, 1839 (1991) (discussing "theories of fair exchange" as alternative
basis for "construct[ing] hypothetical bargains").
15. In efficiency terms "better" is usually defined as that rule "that minimizes the effects of
transaction costs." A. MrrCELL POLNSKY, AN INTRODUCrON TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 13 (1983).

16. "The achievement of desired goals depends on assumptions about how those who will be
subject to a rule will be affected by and react to it." Coffey, supra note 12, at 4.
17. Professor Craswell's article takes account of these efficiency concerns. At one level, the
article is purely descriptive. Craswell's legal decisionmaker seeks to determine if a party's "reliance
was efficient" or not. Craswell, supra note 1, at 495. Craswell posits that courts often take account
of efficient reliance concerns in applying a variety of contract formation rules. See id. at 501-43.
There is an "underground jurisprudence" of efficiency, Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality:
CriticalApproaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 195, 206 (1987), which Craswell seeks to describe and uncover. For example, he posits that "courts (sometimes) decide whether to interpret a
communication as an offer based on the effect an offer would have on B's reliance incentives."
Craswell, supra note 1, at 508. Craswell describes other examples showing the impact of the efficient reliance factor in formation case-law. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 507-43. Craswell goes beyond description into prescription when he argues that efficient reliance analysis necessarily entails a
case-by-case analysis and since at least in some respects the legal alternative to such a case-by-case
approach-a "bright line" rule-is flawed, id. at 545, an instrumental analysis may be preferred, at
least in some respects. See id. at 547-48. Although Professor Craswell has refused explicitly to endorse an instrumental efficiency approach, much of his analysis is devoted to demonstrating how a
particular approach or default rule can be justified in efficiency or hypothetical bargain terms. See id.
at 495-97.
Thus, without seeking to advocate an efficiency-based rule as the optimal one, Craswell's analysis typifies an instrumental approach. Nevertheless, because it fails to compare the suggested rule to
a variety of other private and law-supplied rules and because it fails to account sufficiently for bargaining impediments, the Craswell article cannot completely justify the law-supplied rule which it
describes. See infra part W.A.
18. For a discussion of this methodology see Coffey, supra note 12, at 4.
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the parties' incentives, the authors hope to guide legal decisionmakers in
selecting the optimal rule. Instrumental analysis can potentially resolve
the question of when and why it is appropriate for the law to supplement
private contractual arrangements through a law-supplied liability rule
governing precontractual negotiation.
Three recent authors' 9 have adopted an instrumental approach to
precontractual reliance and other contract formation issues.20 Despite the
analytically helpful shift toward an instrumental framework, scholarly attempts to resolve contractual liability issues remain flawed-they fail to
develop an analytical framework to justify law-supplied default rules as
an adjunct to private arrangements. They ignore bargaining imperfections21 and thereby: (i) fall to justify a law-supplied default rule of implied commitment; 22 (ii) suggest unrealistic or costly solutions requiring a
high degree of knowledge not possible or not obtainable except at great
cost in an uncertain world;23 (iii) neglect the uncertainty problems affecting precontractual negotiation altogether,24 or, while admitting that an informational uncertainty problem exists, ignore the importance of interim
reliance in mitigating uncertainty for the promisor; and (iv) fail to develop a complete framework for comparing alternative solutions which
can solve the myriad of informational uncertainty problems. 25 Such analyses also fail to determine the proper scope of precontractual liabil19. See sources cited supra note 1.
20. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 491-97 (evaluating desirability of enforceability of advance
commitment by judging effects on promisee's incentives to rely and discussing incentive effects on
promisors of rules making them responsible for efficient reliance investments); Katz, supra note 1, at
1257 (using the party with greater bargaining power as a surrogate for identifying which party
should be responsible for costs to promote efficiency); Wils, supra note 1, at 94 (using normative
standard of efficiency); see also Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 660-68 (detailing incentive effects on
promisor and promisee from enforcement and nonenforcement approaches); Goetz & Scott, supra
note 12, at 1270-81 (detailing the incentive effects on promisee and promisor behavior of changes in
the enforceability and "reliability of promises"); Coffey, supra note 12, at 4. But see infra part
IV.G.3 (some analysts eschew model of projecting average behavior, precluding generalized
approach).
21. These bargaining imperfections consist of informational uncertainties-known as bounded
rationality-which prevent the parties from achieving detailed contractual arrangements. See Ova-Va E.
WILLIAMSON, Tim ECONOMIC INsTrrtrtNo

OF CAPrrALISM 57 (1985); see also Kostritsky, supra note

10, at 911-29 (detailing persuasive barriers to fully contingent bargains).
22. See infra part IV.A.
23. See infra part IV.F.
24. See, for example, Craswell's paradigm case, infra note 45 and accompanying text, in
which precontractual uncertainties requiring reliance investment for clarification are neglected. In the
paradigm case the reliance investment helps the investing party to enhance its profits on the ultimate
transaction but it does not address precontractual uncertainties.
25. See infra part VI.

1997]

THE PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY DEBATE

ity,2 exaggerate one strand of the moral hazard 27 problem, 28 and overemphasize the importance of bad faith conduct and misrepresentation
29
problems in precontractual bargaining.
These conceptual flaws handicap the commentators' ability to solve
the real problems in the case law.30 Moreover, certain flaws-particularly
the neglect of bargaining impediments and the marginalization of the pro-

cess of incremental exchange of information-prompt some scholars to
overestimate the likelihood of private solutions to the problem of underinvestment and fail to explain the need for legal intervention through
law-supplied default rules of implied or inferred commitment. In addi-

tion, because some authors' suggested liability rules ignore certain barri26. See infra part VII.
27. The moral hazard problem for precontractual bargainers refers, in part, to the tendency of
promisees to overrely under a rule of compensation for interim reliance. See Craswell, supra note 1,
at 494. The analogous hazard in the insurance industry identified in the literature is the failure of insured persons to "behave in a fully responsible way and take appropriate risk-mitigating actions"
once they are covered under an insurance policy. WLUAMSON, supra note 21, at 47. These moral
hazard problems also arise in the principal/agent context because of (1) the principal's inability to
observe directly the agent's actions, and (2) the principal's inability to discern whether bad outcomes
are due to the agent's poor efforts or to bad exogenous circumstances. See David E.M. Sappington,
Incentives in Principal-AgentRelationships, J. EcoN. PEsp., Spring 1991, at 45, 46 ("Mhe principal
can't observe... the level of effort exerted by the agent."); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINcipAs AND AGENTS: THE STRUcruRE OF BustNasS 38 (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). Moral hazard is a specialized term used to refer to the overall
problem of opportunism. See WHuIAMSON, supra note 21, at 47; Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 642-43;
G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a
New Cause of Action, 44 VAry. L REv. 221, 229 (1991) (describing opportunists as contracting parties who will "serve their self-interests at the expense of their contracting partners").
28. See infra part VIII.
29. See, e.g., Wils, supra note 1, at 106, 110, 117; see also infra part XI. By focusing on
cases of asymmetrical information such analyses neglect other aspects of the uncertainty problem
present when the informational uncertainty is shared equally by both parties. Even prior analyses of
reliance decisions under conditions of symmetrical uncertainty have failed to address adequately
whether the law's role should be expanded beyond "encourag[ing] the parties to choose whatever
form of reliance seems most efficient given the limited information that the parties possess," "[o]nce
the opportunities for improving the parties' information have been exhausted," Letter from Richard
Craswell of the University of Chicago to Juliet P. Kostritsky of Case Western Reserve University 9
(April 14, 1995) (on file with author), to include other possible law-supplied default rules which
might have greater potential for reducing the uncertainty problem by providing more information in
the precontractual phase, as well as other private devices for increasing the availability of information to the parties.
Craswell assumes that the most the law can do "once the opportunities for improving the parties' information have been exhausted" is to encourage the most efficient reliance. See id. at 9. Yet it
seems that the issue should be formulated differently. The question should be what law-supplied
rules, with what content or what private devices, are the least costly and most efficient means of
achieving the parties' goals, such as reducing opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs.
30. See infra part X.
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ers to bargaining, their justifications for law-supplied rules cannot provide a satisfactory explanatory theory 3' justifying (or rejecting) other
instances of law-supplied terms in broader classes of cases in which bargaining impediments exist.
By abstracting precontractual reliance issues from real world
problems of informational and uncertainty problems, certain analyses fail
to provide a generalized model of obstacles which parties must overcome
to achieve private arrangements. 32 Without that model, decisionmakers
cannot select appropriate default rules that would be preferred by average
bargainers to overcome those barriers and to solve the recurrent precontractual problems of sunk costs and opportunism, nor provide rules to
govern precontractual bargaining that can be justified under a hypothetical bargain model. 33 Finally, the marginalization of informational ex31. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of
Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1978) (discussing how explanatory theories are constructed).
32. Recent literature on game theory often focuses on a set of private strategies which parties
may privately adopt, without the aid of law-supplied rules, to achieve efficiency. This article seeks to
compare the relative costs of the private strategies and law-supplied default rules. See generally
DOUGLAs G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994). This article views the private
strategizing and the private means of overcoming the obstacles as only one route to efficiency. An
important question is whether law-supplied rules should ever be preferred to these private
mechanisms.
33. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 677-83 (justifying law-supplied default rule by hypothetical bargain model). For an example justifying a particular cooperation rule based on hypothetical
consent of wealth maximizing parties see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 605 (1990) ("Contracting parties agree (explicitly or
implicitly) to cooperate in the future ... because it lowers the ex ante contract price by more than
the cost of cooperation."); see also Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just
Cause and Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 61 (1993) (approving current judicial willingness to imply some limits on the at-will doctrine and embracing a normative "legal structure that
checks opportunistic behavior"). Generally, contract theorists suggest that in the absence of explicitly
agreed to terms, courts should supply those terms to which most parties would have agreed to save
the parties the transaction costs of explicitly negotiating for them. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 266 (1985) ("[S]tate-supplied terms are mere
facilitators, specifying terms that the parties could formulate themselves if unrestrained by time and
effort costs . . ."); Chamy, supra note 14, at 1816 (focusing on "fundamental issues of method and
justification" in constructing hypothetical bargains); Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory
Approach to Default Provisions and DisclosureRules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
639, 642 (1989) (exploring the "fundamental problem of justifying the imposition of duties ex post
on the grounds that they would have been agreed to ex ante").
Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner have recently reconceptualized the basis of supplying default rules
by suggesting that sometimes it may be appropriate to look beyond what the parties would have
wanted and select "penalty" default rules based not on what the majority of parties wanted but on
what they did not want to force information disclosure. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 94 (1989).
The Ayres and Gertner decision to explain cases in terms of a penalty default rule obscures an im-
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change causes these scholars to ignore a liability default rule which
would solve the *central problem of the propensity for opportunistic exploitation of a promisee's sunk costs and be preferred by the parties as
optimal, given the transaction costs and other barriers which prevent the
achievement of private contractual solutions to the problems of precontractual negotiations. In another article,3 4 I suggest that where transaction
costs, uncertainty, and opportunism converge in precontractual negotiation 35 to hinder the adoption of explicit contract terms, a law-supplied default rule should impose a generalized performance commitment whose
content would make the promisor responsible for compensating the promisee for the reasonable value of whatever steps the promisee had taken
toward the proposed transaction. 36 In this article, I offer a commentary on
current approaches using the framework developed in the earlier article.

I1

RECENT INSTRUMENTALIST APPROACHES TO PRECONTRACrUAL
RELIANCE: THE CONCEPTUAL FLAWS

Three recent authors, Craswell, Katz and Wils, have each embraced
efficiency analyses to determine whether the promisee or the promisor
should bear the costs of precontractual reliance. 37 Yet, because of a neglect of the incremental nature of bargaining, each analysis exhibits certain
flaws that inhibit its ability to guide legal decisionmakers toward optimal
solutions to the problem of precontractual reliance. They fail to account
for important classes of cases-those involving shared uncertainty about
the future-and fail to provide a proper analytical framework for resolving
when law-supplied liability rules should supplement private contractual
arrangements. Moreover, by ignoring the incremental nature of bargaining, these analyses improperly calculate the incentive effects of precontractual liability rules and draw the lines of liability too narrowly. These
analyses fall to justify fully law-supplied liability rules because they discount bargaining imperfections. Moreover these analyses reveal an underlying methodological weakness: they do not first identify problems inherportant issue. The question is not whether the courts should use a majoritarian or penalty default rule
but rather whether the law should intervene at all with a liability rule to solve what is essentially an
adverse selection problem typified by cases involving asymmetry of information or leave the solution
to parties' private arrangements.
34. For an extended discussion of the content and justification for such an obligation, see Kostritsky, supra note 2.
35. Professor Williamson treats this convergence in highlighting "contractual difficulties." See
WILAMSON, supra note 21, at 44-63, 67.
36. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 672.
37. See sources cited supra note 1.
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ent in precontractual bargaining-such the as opportunistic exploitation of
sunk costs (by the non-relying party)-and then systematically examine
potential solutions, taking account of (1) the obstacles that hinder private
solutions and (2) the alternative solutions, public or private, that might
overcome these obstacles and solve the problems. By ignoring some or
all of the parts of this systematic methodology, the analysts fail to ask
questions necessary to analyze completely the optimal rules for precon38
tractual reliance.
39
The Craswell article, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance,
displays an instrumentalist approach when it posits that courts, applying a
wide range of contract doctrines, promote the goal of efficient reliance
by finding a legally enforceable commitment when efficient reliance is
4°
present but denying such a commitment when the reliance is inefficient.
That default rule offers a means of rationalizing myriad decisions and
doctrinal manipulations which would otherwise remain a random
grouping.4"
Professor Craswell's article suffers from several defects. By remaining agnostic and refusing to advocate adoption of the default rule courts
are actually applying, 42 the Craswell article provides insufficient guidance
to courts. The Craswell article also ignores the importance of bargaining
imperfections in formulating a legal default rule to protect efficient reliance, engendering a variety of analytical difficulties. Without directly ad38. See Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law
and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CH. L. REv. 903 (1985) (highlighting certain barriers to well
specified bargains but neglecting comparisons to private adaptations); see also Kostritsky, supra note
2, at 647-50 (discussing the Farber/Matheson theory).
39. Craswell, supra note 1.
40. See id. at 507-08. Craswell indicates that "courts are systematically more inclined to find
a commitment when B[uyer] has relied efficiently." Id. at 507. According to Craswell, the promotion
of such reliance through a default rule would be hypothetically preferred and thus efficient because it
"increases the expected value of the transaction," id. at 496, and benefits both parties by: (1) encouraging promisees to rely efficiently by offering them greater security, and (2) benefitting promisors directly, or indirectly by permitting them to charge more on the ultimate transaction for a legally
enforceable commitment. Id. at 492-96.
41. This rationalization represents the essence of the "explanatory theorist" who "seeks a scientific explanation for the welter of legal microdata, an explanation in the compound form of (1) a
descriptive law that can order the data... and (2) a hypothetical causal model that can account for
the patterning ... and predict the forms of its extensions ...
Miehelman,
c."
supra note 31, at 1035.
42. By uncovering a case-by-case default rule efficiency approach, Craswell is not proposing a
theory which can help courts decide cases using a superior theory. As he explains it, "[o]bviously,
the considerations discussed.., do not establish that case-by-case inquiries are inevitably superior to
bright line formalities. The relative costs and benefits of the two approaches are, ultimately, empirical matters which cannot be resolved a priori." Craswell, supra note 1, at 483-84; see also id. at
553.
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dressing bargaining impediments, the Craswell article cannot fully resolve
why the law should ever supply a default rule of implied commitment, 43
develop a realistic solution to the problem of suboptimal investment, or
compare alternative solutions for precontractual bargaining which might
overcome bargaining obstacles.
Craswell's article also ignores the real world uncertainty problems of
precontractual bargaining in which information is exchanged incrementally 44 over time to reduce uncertainty. By failing to recognize the

crucial role interim reliance plays in reducing promisor uncertainty and
by placing undue reliance on an underlying false paradigm, 45 Craswell
fails to analyze properly the scope of precontractual liability, drawing the
lines of liability too narrowly. His treatment thus fails to capture whole

classes of cases under a liability rule, and wrong results or analysis may
follow.
A second instrumentalist, Wouter Wils, explicitly embraces "normative criteria" such as efficiency 46 to determine the optimal rule to govern
a group of cases: those involving precontractual reliance. 47 Using a model
which scrutinizes the effect of the legal rule on the parties' incentives to
engage in optimal behavior, 48 the Wils article suffers from conceptual
flaws. First, it underestimates the ways in which bargaining impediments
affect precontractual bargainers. It places too much confidence in private
solutions and assumes that parties having symmetrical information can
privately solve the suboptimal reliance investment problem. 49 Secondly,
while helpfully highlighting the problems of strategic behavior and the
tendency of parties to engage in misrepresentations to secure advantages
from the other party, 50 and devising a liability rule to address such
43. See infra part W.A.
44. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J.L & ECON. 233, 240 (1979) (describing the incremental nature of contracting).
45. Craswell views the "paradigmatic case of risky but potentially valuable reliance" as one
in which a potential buyer of widgets must make a decision on whether to invest in a specialized
processing machine which will "make the best use of S[eller]'s widgets." Craswell, supra note I, at
490. The paradigm is false because it assumes that the reliance investment operates only to increase
the value to Buyer by permitting Buyer "to process the widgets more efficiently." Id. The reliance
investment by buyer does not help in reducing the other party's uncertainty. Thus, Craswell's paradigm falsely assumes that the reliance investment is not necessary to determine the ultimate contract.
46. Wils, supra note 1, at 94.
47. Vils does not address other contractual formation questions as Craswell does.
48. See generally Wils, supra note 1.
49. See id. at 99.
50. See id. at 100, 104. One party might, for example, have "an incentive to pretend that the
increased surplus is high enough for the reliance to be efficient, but not high enough to make it
worthwhile to undertake on her own motion." Id. at 100. Such pretense could cause the other party
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strategizing,5 1 the Wils article ignores important classes of cases where
parties simply do not know about the future and consequently fail to devise explicit contractual private protections. By limiting legal intervention
to a liability rule in cases of misrepresentation, 52 or to a restitution rule
which would require "restitution of benefits out of the failed negotiations,"'53 Wils cannot explain why the law should ever intervene with a

law-supplied liability rule in precontractual negotiations exhibiting sym-

metrical uncertainty. He assumes that if information is symmetrical,5 4
then the parties will always reach a private solution when it is efficient,
thus obviating the need for legal intervention.5 5 Wils too narrowly circumscribes liability to cases of active misrepresentation inducing reliance,5 6 or to cases of anticipatory performance,5 7 where the information is
not symmetric. 58 In cases where the information is symmetric, Wils
places too much confidence in the parties' abilities to take steps privately
to induce optimal reliance. Thus, Wils fails to account adequately for the
particular implications that shared uncertainty should have on questions
of precontractual liability.
A number of flaws, related to the failure to account for the informational uncertainties and the incremental exchange of information through
sequential reliance investments, affect the Katz article. Using an efficiency lens, 59 Katz explicitly focuses on the reliance question in the particularized context of subcontracting and considers the incentive effects
to "assume part of the reliance cost, which means a net gain for the acting party." Id.
51. See id. at 106.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 119. "If, at some time during the negotiations, any party engaged in an abnormal
costly action in anticipation of the deal, from which the other party retains a benefit after the failure
of the negotiations, the latter should be held liable to restitute the benefit." Id. at 119-20.
54. Wils would find "[the analysis is equally valid if their information is not full, but symmetric ...." Id. at 98.
55. See id. at 99, 111-112.
56. Wils refers to reliance "as those actions taken by parties in anticipation of the deal in negotiation, which increase the expected surplus from the deal, and the costs and benefits of which fall
on the same acting party." Id. at 97.
57. Wils refers to anticipatory performance as "all actions which are taken by negotiating parties in anticipation of the deal, which increase the surplus from the deal, and the cost and benefits of
which do not fall on the same party." Id. at 110-11.
58. See id. at 106. Wils rules out a "legal rule which obliges parties in precontractual negotiations to contribute to each-other's reliance costs," id. at 103, in cases where there is asymmetrical
information with the acting party having "superior information." Id. at 99. Wils thinks that a liability rule for precontractual reliance "will lead to excessive, inefficient reliance." Id. at 102.
59. Katz, supra note 1, at 1258 ("adopt[ing] economic efficiency as its primary criterion for
evaluating legal rules").
60. Professor Katz implies that his analysis may be applied broadly beyond the subcontracting
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on the parties' behavior of a particular legal rule-the Drennan
rule 6l-implying a term of irrevocability in a subcontractor's offer once
the general contractor has relied on it.
The Katz article reflects a failure to consider the incremental exchange of information in several ways. Professor Katz focuses on the
timing of reliance, 62 either in the post-offer, or pre-offer situation.63 Inthe
first case, Katz assumes that offers can be formulated without regard to
interim reliance since he assumes reliance will follow, not precede, offer
formulation.64 Even in the latter case where pre-offer reliance is contemplated, the reliance investment appears unrelated to the resolution of uncertainty which depends instead merely on the passage of time. The reliance merely allows opportunistic pricing behavior; early reliance is
regarded as "foolish" 65 since it will merely facilitate expropriation. In
precontractual situations, the reliance consists of sunk costs which leave
the relying party vulnerable to opportunistic "expropriat[ion]" 66 by the
non-relying party. In both cases the Katz article ignores the inextricable
link between informational exchanges, the timing of the reliance investment, and the formulation of the terms of an offer. There is no recognition that early investment of reliance could produce significant uncertainty reduction benefits for the offeror which would justify a liability
rule.
A proposed solution to the expropriation problem by Katz 67 also underestimates the importance of and benefits to be derived from early reliance and marginalizes the particular obstacles that prevent the subcontractor and contractor from privately reaching a bargained-for contract
context. See id. at 1281.
61. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958); see also Katz, supra note 1, at
1262-66.
62. Katz, supra note 1, at 1268 (explaining that "there exists in any given negotiation, and for
any given transaction-specific investment, a moment at which it is optimal to begin investing").
63. Professor Katz contemplates, for example, that an offer can be delayed "until the very moment it is socially optimal to rely ...." Katz, supra note 1,at 1273. Katz also discusses a binding
option for a subcontractor's offer pursuant to which "the contractor will want to rely immediately,"
thus contemplating that reliance would follow a full-fledged offer. Id. at 1275. At other times the offer may be delayed until "all uncertainty is resolved," and reliance may have occurred prior to the
offer. Id. at 1274. But these schemes are predicated on offers being formulated without reference to
the nature of the interim reliance.
64. For an example in which Katz assumes reliance may follow, rather than precede an offer,
see id. at 1273.
65. Id. at 1274.
66. Id.
67. This proposed solution is predicated on bargaining power residing with the offeror subcontractor. See id.
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which would fully protect the general contractor in his reliance on the
subcontractor's offer. When the subcontractor makes an offer, the contractor does not yet know if he will ultimately secure the job, so any
consideration furnished by the general contractor in the form of a commitment would have to be conditional in nature. Subcontractors might
not be willing to offer binding options when the return commitment is
conditional and must depend on an undetermined outcome of securing
the overall contract.
These obstacles suggest that Katz's proposed solution of the subcontractor's offering of a binding option in week 3 which will induce immediate (and optimal) reliance is not ideal and will not address the nature of
the uncertainty problem faced by the subcontractor or other potential offerors. 68 Instead, it may be preferable to suggest a law-supplied implied
conditional commitment by the subcontractor-to go through with a fully
specified bargain later absent intervening obstacles-rather than the fully
binding option obligating the subcontractor to his offer. Katz's proposed
solution to the expropriation problem overlooks the interconnection between the formulation of an offer and interim reliance. It assumes that
offers can be formulated, specifically the subcontractor's offer, before reliance investment occurs. However it may be impossible to formulate the
offer without an investment of reliance to reduce uncertainty for the nonacting, non-relying party. Moreover, Katz's approach is partially premised
on a private solution of the parties to a problem of underinvestment by
contractors. 69 Yet, it is not at all clear that a private solution-in the form
of an express option-will be forthcoming. If such a private solution is
not agreed to, then the court must decide if any implied commitment
should be supplied, and if so, what the content of that commitment
should be.
Because Katz attempts to create "a Chinese wall" separating informational exchange issues and the timing of investment in the analysis of
optimal reliance decisionmaking in the post-offer stage, he cannot justify
a law-supplied commitment. Focusing on reliance in the post-offer, precontract situation ignores the important incentive effect between reliance
68. See id. 1274-75.
69. See id. Moreover, the analysis of the problem, tied to which party has the bargaining
power, seems curiously divorced from the facts of the cases. The investment of sunk costs by one
party would seem to give the non-relying party the power and an opportunity to act opportunistically, thereby providing the non-relying party with bargaining power. Katz assumes that bargaining
power operates independently of who invests sunk costs. If the importance of sunk costs is recognized, then it becomes possible to address the follow up question of law-supplied versus private solutions to the essential problem of opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs.
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(often in the form of sunk costs 7°) and the formulation of the terms of
the offer. Examining the incentives and reliance calculations of the offeree in the post-offer context without simultaneously examining how the
offeror and offeree should be encouraged by legal rules to take steps that
are valuable to the other party, in terms of facilitating an offer by reducing promisor uncertainty, ignores the important interactive effects between reliance and the formulation of the offer. Even when Katz's article
addresses pre-offer reliance it ignores informational exchange issues by
failing to tie the interim reliance to the reduction of uncertainty for the
offeror or to the formulation of the terms of the offer. Instead, the uncertainty appears to resolve itself through time, and the resolution of uncertainty seems unconnected to the reliance. Because interim reliance,
whether occurring post-offer or pre-offer, is viewed solely as a potential
liability for the offeror which will tend to negate the profit which would
otherwise accrue to the offeror,71 there is no sense that an early commitment from the offeror could benefit the offeror.
The marginalization of precontractual information can be seen in the
following Katz illustration:
If ... the contractor has all the bargaining power, no subcontractor will want to
commit to a binding option before the last week. This is because, in order to break
even on such an option, she [a subcontractor] must charge enough of a profit to
cover the reliance damages she must pay if she is unable to perform72

An early commitment 73 will not yield apparent benefits because either the
offeror-subcontractor will be liable for wasted reliance or, if the subcontractor is available, the contractor will offer a "take it or leave it offer"
which is "just over cost" 74 and therefore not advantageous to the subcontractor. Under this Katz scenario, minimizing the importance of interim
reliance, subcontractors will delay offers because of the possibility that
making offers could render the offeror responsible for the wasted reliance
of the offeree. The offeror seems motivated solely by her efforts to avoid
liability for wasted reliance and thus increase potential profits on the ultimate transaction by reducing the possibilities of liability for reliance.
70. Sunk costs are defined by Professor Shell as "assets that are specifically tailored to the
transaction and cannot be fully salvaged outside the transaction." Shell, supra note 27, at 229; see
also Craswell, supra note 1,at 490-91 (discussing reliance investment "with little resale value,"
which makes the investing party "more vulnerable to renegotiation by S[eller]").
71. See Katz, supra note 1,at 1276.
72.

Id.

73. Presumably this commitment would take the form of an option contract. See id.
74. Id.
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There is little recognition that an early commitment might yield advantages for the offeror which would more than offset the liability for interim reliance.
Katz's calculations for judging the optimality of reliance thus ignore
important informational uncertainty issues. The cost benefit calculus examines discounted net profits on a transaction by trading off the cost of
the reliance investment with the overall discounted profits on the ultimate
transaction.75 That calculus, however, ignores the potential benefit to the
offeror from the reliance investment (an externality as the benefit falls on
the putative offeror),7 6 by tending to discount the value of early investments of reliance. Without a direct examination of the benefits from
early reliance, and the barriers which hinder private bargaining to achieve
those benefits, Katz cannot resolve whether a law-supplied rule could
better (more cheaply) achieve those benefits than other alternative
arrangements.
Finally, the overall neglect of bargaining impediments to explicit
contractual devices to control precontractual opportunism disables Katz,
Craswell, and Wils from fully comparing the private strategies that parties might use to overcome such obstacles with law-supplied default rules
for overcoming the same obstacles. The failure to do so prevents them
from devising a structural framework which would determine the appropriateness of law-supplied terms in a broad class of cases.
H.

THE PARADIGM CASE: RECONTEXTUALIZING THE PRECONTRACTUAL
RELIANCE IssuE

The importance of these neglected information issues can be seen in
the famous Hoffinan v. Red Owl case. 77 Hoffman illustrates how the incremental exchange of information and the investment of sunk costs by a
putative promisee operate to reduce uncertainty for the putative promisor
75. Katz arrives at net profits by taking "potential profits" and discounting them to reflect
"the chance that the subcontractor will be unable to perform," and subtracting the possible "lost reliance" from the "discounted profits." Id. at 1268-70; see also infra part IX.
76. This neglect is seen in Katz's assumption that offerors can achieve fully contingent offers
without reliance action: "If the reliance-inducing statement is specific enough to be classified as an
offer ... as in the construction cases, the offeree can protect himself by accepting ....
Katz,
supra note 1, at 1305. The neglect of the value of interim reliance is also seen in a scheme which
states "[a]t the outset, the parties' background rights are established by the legal framework" and
only at the "second stage" are reliance investments contemplated. Id. at 1308; see also Wils, supra
note 1, at 98 (discussing the externality problem in reliance investment context.); see also infra part

IX.
77.

133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
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and affect the bargaining process. 78 Early on Red Owl, the grocery store
operation, was willing to discuss a franchise undertaking that it might
wish to make in the future-a projected promise or transaction. 79 Initially,
the details and terms of the ultimate franchise arrangement could not be
established in an explicitly reciprocal bargain form 0 because of the unforeseeability of the future and the uncertainty about what the ultimate
promise should look like. Red Owl, for example, would have liked to offer a contract containing explicit adequate controls on the putative franchisee's future behavior in the form of express contract provisions but
could not foresee all of the potential future choices that the franchisee
might have wanted to make which could have affected the franchisor.8 1
These uncertainties made it difficult to achieve a complete contingent
franchise contract at the beginning of the negotiations. To reduce the uncertainty and facilitate an agreement on the potential future terms of the
projected promise, the putative promisor suggested that the promisee take
some initial steps consisting of sunk costs invested incrementally and irrevocably committed to the promisor, which steps would make it possible
to later finalize the franchise transaction. In the actual Red Owl case the
steps consisted of the plaintiff taking certain steps such as the acquisition
82
and sale of a small grocery store and the sale of his bakery business.
Presumably, through these steps, Red Owl was able to screen Hoffman's
business acumen and franchisee potential.8 3 In a sense, the only way for
Red Owl to decide if the Hoffman deal would work was through the
promisee, Hoffman, taking some initial steps. The taking of such steps
would make it possible to finalize subsequent franchise terms. Because of
the dynamics of preliminary bargaining, putative promisors often seek the
promisee's conduct as a way of reducing uncertainty risks-a valuable
78.

For a discussion of such "informational action" which may alleviate uncertainty, see JACK

HLRSH.EFER & JOHN A. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 205 (1992).

79. See Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 269. It is important to recognize that a promisor might not be
willing initially to commit to the terms of the ultimate agreement in an explicitly reciprocal way because of various persuasive barriers but might be willing to commit to and be bound by a different
implicit bargain. See generally Kostritsky, supra note 2.

80. See Interview with Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, in Cleveland, Ohio (July 1991).
81. The unforeseeability of the future is part of what the economists call "bounded rationality." WILUAMSON, supra note 21, at 45-46. Principals face the same problem as they cannot foresee
all of the possible future contingencies that will require the agent's attention, and thus cannot easily
devise contractual arrangements to control the agent's conduct in such cases. See id. at 59 n.20.
82. 133 N.W.2d at 269-70.
83. See Robert W. Gordon, Remarks at the AALS Week-Long Conference on Contracts, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (June 1989).
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screening device. The precontractual uncertainty and the interactive exchange of information inherent in Hoffman-like cases have been insufficiently accounted for in the recent instrumental approaches to precontrac84
tual reliance.

IV. TAKING INSUFFICIENT AccouNT OF CONTRACrNG BARRIERS IN
FORMULATING CONTRAcT FORMATION DEFAULT RULES OF IPLIED
COMMITmENTS

A. Failure to Justify a Law-Supplied Default Rule of Implied
Commitment
Recent approaches to precontractual reliance have neglected the
Hoffnan-type paradigm by minimizing the importance of bargaining imperfections. Without an understanding of those aspects of bargaining, including uncertainty, which act as structural impediments to complete and

explicit contractual agreements, it is not possible to rationalize a rule of
law-supplied obligation. 5 An understanding of these uncertainties of
precontractual negotiation and of the promisor's attendant need for information from the promisee (which can be obtained through sunk costs of
the promisee) must inform consideration of a rule which seeks to supply,
by law, terms not expressly agreed to. Although the legal issue in this
and other formation contexts is often formulated in other doctrinal
84. The Hoffman paradigm has surfaced in a variety of recent cases. See, e.g., Esquire Radio
& Elec., Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff ceased work for
defendant's competitors and stocked large quantities of parts at defendant's request based on its
promise to repurchase; plaintiff's actions shielded defendant from effects of market uncertainty);
Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986) (retail store developed remodeling
plans, created marketing strategy, and purchased equipment for a new site based on putative lessor's
promise to remove site from market and negotiate only with tenant towards final lease; interim reliance reduced lessor's uncertainty about securing a tenant and enhanced possibility of searching for
best tenant at higher rate); Christensen v. Intelligent Sys., 399 S.E.2d 495 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (putative purchaser operated seller's subsidiary during purchase negotiations while seller advanced subsidiary $600,000, based on putative purchaser's promise to purchase the subsidiary, thereby giving the
putative purchaser the benefit of reduced uncertainty about the subsidiary's worth); Giant Food, Inc.
v. Ice King, Inc., 536 A.2d 1182 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1988) (plaintiff built a new plant to meet
defendant's projected needs based on defendant's promise to use seller as its supply source); see also
cases cited in Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 695-705.
85. In fact, an understanding of bargaining impediments has formed the basis for rationalizing
other law-supplied default rules (of generalized performance obligations governing an agent's conduct) in the different context of principal/agent rules. See generally Arrow, supra note 27. Without
an understanding of the costly impediments to private efforts to control agent conduct that diverges
from the principal's interest, it is difficult to justify a law-supplied rule. See John A.C. Hetherington,
Bargainingfor FiduciaryDuties: Preserving the Vulnerability of the Disadvantaged?,70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 341, 347 (1992) (discussing relevance of "obstacles to . . . negotiating express" contractual
provisions in deciding if law should supply duty of loyalty).
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terms,8 6 in essence the issue can be reduced to the following question:
should a court or legislature add to or modify what the parties have expressly bargained for? For example, in precontractual reliance contests,
should the court supply a term making a promise irrevocable and binding
even though the parties have not expressly bargained for a term of
irrevocability?
The failure to explore the full panoply of bargaining impediments in
incremental precontractual negotiation (or other bargaining contexts) in
any analysis necessarily mars its capacity to fully resolve the question of
why a legal liability rule of an implied commitment is required. In circumstances where the parties are able to bargain, they should presumably
be able to reach efficient outcomes by private contract. A law-supplied
liability rule of an implied commitment should be unnecessary, the legal
able to bargain to an
rule should not matter, and the parties should be 87
optimal outcome regardless of the initial legal rule.
Because of its neglect of the barriers to contracting, Craswell's instrumental analysis of liability rules for precontractual reliance, as well as
other formation rules, remains incomplete. To the extent that any analysis
of the merits of a law-supplied default rule8 8 does so without a close
analysis of contracting barriers, it cannot fully explain why the law
should select or imply a particular default rule, the content of which imposes liability for efficient reliance. Without a model of contractual barriers, no analysis can resolve the fundamental question of why, if it is
truly in the interest of the parties to have a legally enforceable commitment, they failed to agree to the commitment explicitly. 9 A complete rationale for a law-supplied rule of obligation must analyze why the law
should supply a commitment if the parties are able to bargain and price
the value of a commitment between them and fail to do so. Justifying a
86. See infra note 95.
87. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960) ("the ultimate
result (which maximises [sic] the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the
pricing system is assumed to work without cost").
88. Craswell's recent article assesses the merits of a law-supplied default rule imposing an enforceable commitment when the reliance is efficient, but not otherwise, by comparing the benefits
and drawbacks of such a default rule against the benefits and drawbacks of an alternative "bright
line" rule denying liability in such cases to "encourage the parties to decide for themselves when a
commitment would induce efficient reliance, and to signal their decision more clearly to the courts
and to each other." Craswell, supra note 1, at 484. Ultimately Craswell appears to eschew a normative conclusion, choosing instead to describe the importance of the parties' reliance incentives on the
outcome of judicial decisions.
89. See, e.g., Kostritsky, supra note 11, at 201 (suggesting that arguments to include implicit
obligations to coordinate must address why the parties failed to explicitly negotiate such a term).
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law-supplied default rule of implied commitment must depend on a recognition of the constraints to bargaining which prevent the parties from
privately reaching an optimal outcome, as well as on a model of
predefined goals and average behavior.90
The marginalization of bargaining impediments and the suggestion
"that the law has to have some kind of default rule to address every issue: even issues on which there is no imperfection preventing the parties
from bargaining to their own solution" 9' causes Craswell to foster the
mistaken belief that default rules can be formulated without regard to
bargaining impediments and creates confusion on the nature of default
rules themselves and on the appropriate justification for different kinds of
default rules. If default rules are defined to include law-supplied rules in
which courts refuse to engage in implication of terms as well as default
rules in which courts imply terms, then at least with respect to default
rules of no implied terms, bargaining impediments need not be a prerequisite. However, if one defines default rules to include only default rules
90.

See Coffey, supra note 12, at 4.

91. Letter from Richard Craswell to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 3. Here I would differ from Professor Craswell. If the parties could have easily reached a private agreement, then it
would seem that the courts should take a hands-off policy and not supply any obligation that was not
expressly agreed to by the parties. Adoption of a law-supplied default rule in circumstances where
no impediment prevented the private adoption of an explicit term seems nonsensical-it represents
bad public policy. If no barriers existed, then presumably the parties would have achieved a complete contingent bargain if they had wanted any liability to attach for reliance expenditures. Courts
are (and should be) reluctant to supply terms when the parties could easily have adopted the terms
themselves, particularly because of the courts' inabilities to account for subjective valuations. See
Louis De Alessi & Robert J. Staaf, Subjective Value in Contract Law, 145 J. INST'L & THEoREnTCAL
EcON. 561, 561 (1989) (discussing the implications of the divergence between personal use value and
objective value). Craswell discusses this argument when he says: "some readers may feel that the
presumption or default rule in cases of silence should unquestionably be a rule of 'no commitment.' " Craswell, supra note I, at 485.
Craswell then contrasts the rule of no commitment with a default rule of implied commitment.
He finds the attempt to distinguish these rules by their level of "imposition" to be fruitless since
"neither rule is 'imposed' . . . since each is merely a default rule which allows her to specify a different relationship ...." Id. at 485-86.
While I wholeheartedly agree that default rules are not "imposed" in the former since they are
not immutable, it is important to keep in mind that these rules contain very different contents. One
content seeks to supply terms by implication and the other refuses to do so. The different content of
those rules suggests that they may be appropriate for different contexts depending on the presence or
absence of certain bargaining impediments. The absence of a focus on those impediments impairs
Craswell's ability to apply appropriately these distinct default rules even while suggesting that he
will "identify some of the economic reasons that might favor a default rule of noncommitment or its
opposite." Craswell, supra note 1, at 486. Without a bargaining impediment model Craswell can
only suggest economic interests but cannot fully rationalize a law-supplied rule and intervention.
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of implied terms, then a decision to invoke such default rules must depend on bargaining impediments.
The debate on the relevance of bargaining imperfections to the content of default rules is more than a debate of terminological niceties; it
raises the fundamental question of the methodological justification for legal intervention. Bargaining imperfections must play a role in the formulation of a default rule whose content is one of implied obligation. 92 To
the extent that bargaining imperfections do not exist, a court should decline to add to or modify what the parties have expressly agreed to. Such

a rule is a default rule that the law supplies but, because "it is the absence of any implied term being added or any express term being modified or deleted,"' 93 it is not a law-supplied default rule that seeks to furnish terms. "In other words, it is the very opposite of a default
implication. It is a default in the form of a refusal to engage in
94
implication."
Bargaining impediments are and should be relevant to the content
and thus the type of default rule that the law should adopt-either a lawsupplied default rule that supplies terms by implication or a default rule
which refuses to engage in any implication of terms. However, by failing
to explore systematically the relevance of bargaining impediments to the
analytically distinct default rules, one of which supplies terms by implication and one of which refuses to do so, Professor Craswell risks merging two distinct kinds of law-supplied default rules. 95 More fundamen92. Craswell addresses the content issue in his letter when he says that "the presence or absence of bargaining imperfections might be quite relevant to the question of which default rule the
law ought to adopt, given that the law has to adopt a default rule of one kind or another." Letter
from Richard Craswell to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 3. However, Craswell is talking
about selecting a rule's content based on the difficulties of contracting around a non-optimal rule that
parties with different preferences might have. Id.; see also infra part IVE. This article views the difficulties of bargaining around an initial non-optimal default rule as only one kind of bargaining imperfection that is relevant to selecting the content of a default rule of implied obligation. Other bargaining imperfections which prevent parties from ex ante achieving contractually complete
mechanisms for curbing certain inherent problems are also relevant to content selection.
93. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law
School, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School (May
23, 1995).
94. Id.
95. The failure to distinguish clearly default rules of implied commitment from default rules
refusing to imply commitments causes Professor Craswell to obscure the central question of should,
and when should, the law supply an obligation in a particular doctrinal context. One of these doctrinal contexts involves option contracts. Such contracts "bind the seller to remain ready to transact on
the offered terms, but do not bind the buyer at all." Craswell, supra note 1, at 498. Craswell views
the option contract as a way to explain and justify other one-sided commitments such as the implied
option contract in the Drennan context. In the Drennan case, the court had to decide what effect a
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tally, in suggesting that default rules include all of those cases in which a
court renders a decision, even those refusing to add or modify terms,
Professor Craswell obscures the central issue in many of these cases:
when should a court supply or infer terms when the parties have failed to
do so? 96
general contractor's reliance would have on a subcontractor's offer. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,
333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). Justice Traynor decided that the reliance made the offer irrevocable, at
least for a reasonable period of time. Id. at 759-60. In effect, the court implied a term of irrevocability, thereby creating an implied option contract Yet, the true option contract and the implied option
contract of section 87(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts remain fundamentally different
cases because it is only in the latter case that a court must rationalize a law-supplied commitment.
Although it may be true that a law-supplied commitment would "increase the expected value" by inducing "an efficient level of reliance," Craswell, supra note 1, at 496, 497, and, therefore, courts
should be less skeptical of such commitments, see id. at 498-99, a rule justification for a law-supplied rule must look outside of analogies which are based on expressly agreed to one-sided commitments, such as option contracts, and focus instead on cases where the parties remain silent. In addition, a court, as part of its rule justification, must seek to explain why the court should supply an
obligation even if it is arguably in the parties' mutual interests and identify what classes of cases call
for a law-supplied commitment.
96. Indeed, many of the disparate doctrinal examples of contract formation rules discussed by
Professor Craswell in his recent article can be recast as examples of courts deciding whether to supply terms not expressly agreed to or to refuse to do so, as Craswell himself argues. Thus, in deciding
"the duration of the power of acceptance," Craswell, supra note 1, at 512, courts have to decide
what approach to adopt, even if the parties have not expressly agreed on when the power to accept
will terminate. The court may decide to supply such a time (a reasonable time) as a default rule.
Similarly, in deciding what the court should do when the parties themselves have provided no explicit term on whether rejection terminates an offer, the courts may nonetheless supply a term not
expressly agreed to-a default rule-that terminates the offer on rejection by the offeree. Courts, in effect, also supply a term not expressly agreed to in the context of the doctrine of part performance of
unilateral contracts. Traditionally, as Craswell explains, offerors could revoke any time up until performance was complete. Id. at 526; see E. ALLAN FARNswoRTH, FARNswoRTH ON CONTRACrS § 3.24,
at 192-93 (1990). Courts today protect the offeree against revocation, through the doctrine of ReSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1981), once the offeree has begun part performance. The
doctrinal protection afforded such offerees can also be conceptualized in terms of a court supplying a
term not expressly agreed to by the parties. The court in effect supplies a term of non-revocability
once the part performance by the offeree has begun. The doctrine of "irrevocability by estoppel,"
Craswell, supra note 1, at 531, similarly involves the courts in deciding the effect of reliance by an
offeree. Modem courts find that such reliance both binds offerors to irrevocable offers, see R..TATE,
MENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981), and disables promisors from revoking their promises.
See id. § 90. These cases, too, in essence raise the question of whether a court should imply a legally enforceable commitment even if the parties have not expressly agreed to that term.
The question of when the law should intervene and supply terms not expressly agreed to arises
in many other contexts. In the principal/agent context the court must decide whether the court should
impose a performance obligation on the agent even if the parties did not expressly agree to it, and if
so, what the terms of the performance obligation should look like. See Ronald J. Coffey, Firm Opportunities: Property Right Assignments, Firm Detriment, and the Agent's Performance Obligation,
13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 155, 156 n.5 (1988) (examining "[tihe nature and causes of fiduciary duty
emerg[ing] as a function of natural barriers to the formation of comprehensive, express (market) contracts"). Lender liability cases also raise the central question of whether the law should supply any
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Once these distinct types of default rules are made analytically distinct and bargaining impediments adequately accounted for, it becomes
clear that the law should not supply a default rule that supplies terms or
obligations by implication where bargaining imperfections do not exist.
The existence of bargaining imperfections should be a prerequisite for
supplying a law-supplied rule which seeks to add to, or modify, terms
expressly agreed to. Because, however, Professor Craswell conflates default rules to include law-supplied rules of both kinds, including as default rules both those in which the law decides to add to express terms
and those in which it refuses pointedly to engage in any implication of
terms, he suggests courts are using a possible default rule 97 to foster efficient reliance "whenever the potential benefits of reliance (weighted by
the probability that S[eller] will in fact perform) exceed the potential
losses from reliance (weighted by the probability that S[eller] will not
perform)" 98 without regard to bargaining impediments.
Professor Katz has also minimized the importance of bargaining impediments in his analysis of "when should an offer stick,"9 9 in ways
which similarly limit Katz's ability to justify a state-supplied default rule.
The neglect of such impediments is reflected in his decision to avoid
"address[ing] the interaction between default rules chosen by the state or
private associations on the one hand, and rules actually selected by individual contracting parties on the other." 10o That formulation obscures the
central issue in these cases: to what extent the state's choice of a lawsupplied default rule should depend on whether the rules actually chosen
by the parties reflect the optimal ones. Thus there is an inevitable "interaction" which cannot be ignored. For the law to determine when it will
add to what the parties have explicitly negotiated through a law-supplied
term, it must examine whether private barriers to contracting limit the
terms actually chosen. If such barriers exist, the legal decisionmaker may
then decide that the terms actually chosen are not optimal and can intelliterms not expressly agreed to. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE
L. 131, 140 (1989). See also the bondholder context in which courts must decide whether to imply
any obligations beyond the explicit indenture provisions. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.) (en band), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
97. Craswell is agnostic on whether the law should adopt the default rule proposed. But see
supra note 17.
98. Craswell, supra note 1, at 491.
99. Katz, supra note 1, at 1266 (citing Karl Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L. 779, 802 (1939)).
100.

Id. at 1257.
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gently decide between intervention through a law-supplied term and nonintervention.
In excluding the interaction between state selected default rules and
rules actually selected by private parties, Katz has made it difficult to resolve whether the state should intervene by supplying a term through a
default rule. It is only by looking at the rules actually agreed to and explicitly negotiated by the parties and at the bargaining impediments affecting those explicit agreements that a legal decisionmaker can determine whether the law should intervene (through a law-supplied term) and
thus impose a state-supplied default rule. If the decisionmaker concludes
that "the law can supply a rule that makes it possible" to achieve certain
goals at a cost and does so "with a greater net benefit than any private
strategy, then it is justifiable on that ground ... ."101 By looking at the
parties' actual agreements and by examining bargaining impediments to
privately agreed-on terms, as well as the cost of alternative private strategies, a decisionmaker can determine that a law-supplied default rule
would be optimal, making the interaction between private agreements and
state-supplied terms a crucial one.
The minimization of bargaining impediments in the Katz article is
also reflected in the author's decision to isolate questions of "comparative institutional competence'' °0 in determining "who sets the rules,"'' 3
from "identifying the default rule . . . ." 04 In fact, the relative costs of
parties adopting private strategies versus the costs of law-supplied default
rules-questions of institutional competence and costs-directly affect what
the content of the default rule should be and whether the state should
supply it as an adjunct to private arrangements, or whether it should be
left entirely to private arrangements. If a law-supplied term will "improve[] achievement of such [ultimate] goals by surmounting obstacles
that will not be eliminated by private strategies,"'' 05 then the preferred approach may be for the state to intervene by supplying a term beyond that
which the parties have explicitly agreed to. Thus, the "comparative institutional competence" 10 6 issue cannot be looked at in isolation from the
content of the default rule itself. High transaction costs for private parties
101. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law
School, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Univer sity Law School (July
11, 1995).
102. Katz, supra note 1, at 1257.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Coffey, supra note 12, at 6.
106. Katz, supra note 1, at 1257.
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adopting private strategies to overcome certain problems (such as opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs) bear on questions of "comparative institutional competence." 10 7 Such costs must be accounted for and compared to costs of law-supplied rules before it becomes possible to decide
not only who should supply the rule but what the content of the default
rule should be. Under certain circumstances a law-supplied default rule
of implied terms may be appropriate, assuming the content of the lawsupplied term will achieve the parties' goals at less cost than alternative
methods.
The failure to justify fully a law-supplied rule by comparing the
costs of private strategies and law-supplied rules as alternative means of
overcoming obstacles to private contract arrangements can be seen in
Katz's defense of his rule "[a]ssigning losses to the least-cost avoider"108
as a way of achieving efficient reliance.10 9
What is implicit in this formulation of a liability rule is that the
least cost avoider should be bound by a liability rule which imposes
losses for wasted reliance even when the parties have not agreed to the
rule explicitly by contract. The justification is of course the promotion of
efficient reliance.
To illustrate the operation of the rule, Katz indicates that typically
franchisors should be held "liable for precontractual representations and
offers"' 10 in part because they have superior bargaining power. Under
such circumstances "the offeree will have no incentive to rely at all, unless he can bind the offeror to an agreement beforehand.""' Without the
2
liability rule, Katz argues investment will be suboptimal."
I agree with Professor Katz that investment will be suboptimal
whenever there is the power to "expropriate" the sunk costs of the offeree." 3 What is lacking in Katz's article is a sense that the problem of
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1293.
109. See id. ("The idea is to delegate the responsibility of performing a cost-benefit analysis
to the party best suited to carrying it out when courts or regulatory authorities are not up to the
task."). One difficulty with the Katz scheme assigning losses to the party with bargaining power is
that it seems to imply that bargaining power will operate independently of the sunk cost issue. In
many cases it is the sinking of costs by one party which gives the other party the power to act opportunistically. It is this recurrent problem which requires control. The question then becomes which
solution will best curb opportunism at the least cost.
110. Id. at 1300.
Ill. Id. at 1274.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 1274; see also WItnAMSON, supra note 21, at 64-67 (discussing the opportunism
problem generally).
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suboptimal investment is a problem of opportunistic behavior that affects
many bargaining contexts and that requires the analyst to determine
whether private contract arrangements, other incentive schemes, or lawsupplied default liability rules are the optimal solution to the underinvestment problem. That determination cannot be made without an assessment
of the costs and benefits of each solution, given extant bargaining impediments. In fact, if Professor Katz had focused on the structural problem
of the potential for opportunism given the investment of sunk costs, then
it is unlikely that he would have viewed the typical general-subcontractor
paradigm as one in which the general contractor has the greater bargaining power, but as one in which the power for opportunistic behavior resides in the party for whom sunk costs have been invested. Once the
structure of opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs is recognized as paramount, Katz's focus on which party has the bargaining power seems
misplaced. The power to exploit sunk costs presumably acts as a disincentive for promisees to invest sunk costs. The central question should be
whether private contractual solutions or other private approaches can
check opportunism, or whether a law-supplied rule is preferable as least
costly.
The failure of Professors Katz and Craswell to explore the panoply
of bargaining impediments in the context of the problem of opportunistic
exploitation of sunk costs leaves the reader with a myriad of questions
which must be answered to rationalize fully any default rule. If the parties can distribute benefits and losses through price, then why can't they
bargain on their own to achieve efficient reliance if it is in both parties'
interests to do so? Why doesn't the agreed-on explicit bargain reflect the
parties' interests? If barriers between a Buyer and a Seller 1 4 are not insuperable, wouldn't Buyers also be able to achieve a higher level of efficient reliance through a variety of other private means? Sellers could
enter into a private side agreement to pay Buyers to rely whenever it was
efficient to do So. 1 15 Under these circumstances, and assuming no barriers
to contracting, why would a law-supplied liability rule be appropriate? In
the absence of bargaining obstacles there would seem to be no particular
reason to opt for a default rule of enforceability over a default rule of
114. This mythical Buyer and Seller appear throughout Professor Craswell's article: "For convenience, I will refer to a paradigmatic case where a seller, S, and a buyer, B, are considering a possible transaction. In most of my examples, B[uyer] will be the party who relies on the proposed deal,
while S[eller] will be the party who eventually tries to withdraw .... " Craswell, supra note 1, at
484. I have continued the same Buyer/Seller paradigm throughout this article.
115. See Wils, supra note 1, at 99 ("it will always be in the other party's interest to pay part
of the reliance cost so as to induce the acting party to rely").
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nonenforceability. Couldn't the affected parties achieve efficiency with a
contrary rule of nonenforceability? Are there other private devices which
the parties could use (and might prefer) to facilitate efficient reliance
rather than providing a default rule of implied commitment? Would a private side agreement be more efficient than a legal default rule that made
Seller responsible for all efficient reliance, that is for reliance that would
increase the "expected value of the total transaction?" 1 16 Would parties
prefer a law-supplied rule over other private arrangements 17 which they
might employ and over other law-supplied rules to promote efficient

reliance?
Resolving how and why the law should'1 8 intervene with a law-

supplied default rule of implied commitment requires a model of the realities of the bargaining process, including the uncertainty problems
which disable promisors from initially specifying obligations that are
fully specified as to price, etc." 9 Parties often fail to contract explicitly
for legally enforceable commitments which would protect interim reliance by creating contractual liability because, at the time the promisee
must invest, the putative promisor does not know enough to commit to
the ultimate transaction and assume a voluntary commitment that is well
specified as to price and other terms. Any putative promisor faces enormous uncertainty barriers which interfere with the parties' private attempts to achieve efficient reliance through either the parties' express
adoption of a liability rule to govern the compensability of precontractual
reliance or other private devices.

Without a recognition of those barriers' 20 -a recognition not present
116. Craswell, supra note 1, at 495.
117. For an explanation of some of these private devices in the contexts of agency contracts
and precontractual bargaining see Kostritsky, supra note 2,at 657-60.
118. Craswell seems to confine himself to describing what courts actually do without deciding
whether that is in fact optimal. Yet he does state that the "cases provide precedential support for the
proposition that courts are entitled to consider the efficiency of B[uyer]'s reliance," Craswell, supra
note 1, at 507, suggesting that there is merit in the efficient reliance criterion. Craswell seems to
adopt a normative stance when he suggests "the cases surveyed below shed light on whether courts
ought to be trying to judge the efficiency of B[uyer]'s reliance on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 508.
119. As Professor Craswell has done, it is possible to argue that default rules may be devised
without reference to bargaining impediments. He argues that "it can't be a sound argument to say
that the law should adopt default rules only for circumstances where there is some kind of bargaining imperfection that prevents efficient private agreements" because "the law has to have some kind
of default rule ... [because] courts have to be able to render a decision if they get a case where the
parties have remained silent-and the ruling the courts would render in such a case is, by definition, a
default rule." Letter from Richard Craswell to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 3.
120. See generally Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 641-46 (detailing structural impediments to
fully contingent and explicitly reciprocal agreements).
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in Craswell or Katz's articles-a theorist cannot explain why the parties
were not able to reach a fully specified bargained-for private arrangement
for encouraging efficient reliance (such as a side payment) if they have
an incentive to do so. An author ignoring those barriers cannot determine
which particular default rule would be the most efficient and therefore
optimal rule. Although Craswell attempts to justify the adoption of a lawsupplied default rule in terms of its potential for promoting mutually beneficial reliance,' 2 ' and therefore, in terms of the objectives sought by both
parties, his justification for his suggested law-supplied default rule seems
problematic. Even if one assumes that a law-supplied default rule would
promote mutually beneficial reliance, a legal decisionmaker must still
grapple with whether, and on what basis, the law should imply obligation
when the parties fail to adopt it explicitly. Professor Katz similarly encourages the adoption of a rule allocating reliance losses to the "leastcost avoider" to achieve optimal investment.'2 Yet Katz too fails to determine if the suggested rule would be preferable to other private strategies for overcoming the barriers to private contractual efforts to control
opportunistic behavior and promote optimal investment.
Ultimately, the failure to explore bargaining impediments ties into a
broader failure: decontextualizing a rule's justification from the broader
context of incremental precontractual bargaining to which the rule should
apply. Without exploring the context, including the transaction costs that
might prevent the parties from expressly adopting the commitment or the
costs of alternative private strategies for achieving the same outcomes of
efficient reliance and thereby overcoming the converging problems of
bounded rationality, sunk costs and opportunism,'23 one cannot demonstrate that a particular default rule is the most efficient solution to the
24
bargaining problems which average bargainers face.
121. Under Craswell's model "an advance commitment by S[eller] can lead to a more efficient level of reliance by B[uyer]. In most of those cases, it would also be in S[eller]'s interest to
agree to such a commitment." Craswell, supra note 1, at 495. A legal rule which would also increase reliance, id. at 493, would permit "S[eller] to withdraw whenever circumstances made consummation of the transaction inefficient, but which forbade S[eller] from withdrawing ... whenever
consummation was efficient ... ." Id.
122. Katz, supra note 1, at 1293.
123. Professor Williamson highlights the relevance of these characteristics. See W=LIAMSON,
supra note 21, at 44-61.
124. Professor Coffey explains the necessity of comparing the effects of rule intervention and
nonintervention as a means of solving bargaining impediments and reaching goal achievement at the
least cost as follows:
If intervention is seen, under such a condition, as improving achievement of such goals by
surmounting obstacles that will not be eliminated by private strategies (unassisted by inter-
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B. Reconceptualizing the Basis for a Law-Supplied Rule: From Private
Welfare Maximization to DistributionistConcerns?
The marginalization of the bargaining impediments in the default
rule literature not only undermines attempts to justify particular lawsupplied rules but also lays the groundwork for a fundamental shift in the
rationale for law-supplied rules. Commentators have embraced lawsupplied rules to promote hypothetical bargains that the parties themselves would have adopted absent the transaction costs of doing so. 25 By
suggesting that the law imply legally enforceable commitments without
regard to bargaining impediments, 26 Professor Craswell abandons the
traditional assent-based justification for law-supplied rules and embraces
an approach to default rule formulation which potentially shifts the justificative rationale for a law-supplied rule away from the promotion of the
parties' private welfare toward the promotion of distributional or fairness
concerns.
Professor Katz too lays the foundation for such a shift in rationale.
He underestimates the bargaining impediments which exist to the adoption of private contractual solutions to a potential underinvestment problem. For example, he suggests that in cases where the subcontractor has
all the bargaining power, "a rational contractor without any bargaining
power would refuse to rely at all ...."127 Yet Katz's suggested solution
is "a binding option in week 3" by the offeror.'28 If private incentives
exist to formulate an option contract, there would seem to be no particular reason for the law to imply a liability rule on the party with bargaining power, although this is possibly what Katz suggests in his rule allocating reliance losses to the party with bargaining power. 29
Separating out the distinct reasons for contractual gaps underscores
the potential for a shift in rationale which is implicit in Craswell's and
Katz's approaches.' 30 Contractual gaps exist, in part, because of the unvention) with the same net gain (after deducting whatever costs are cognizable in the value
system adopted), the rule will be to grant intervention on some stated set of conditions.
Ronald J. Coffey, Methodological Perspective 6 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the

author).
125. See, e.g., Coleman et al., supra note 33, at 641.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 88-98.
127. Katz, supra note 1, at 1274.
128. Id.
129. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1293. The focus on the parties' private solutions is also evident in the way Katz formulates the article: "Rather than ask whether the parties should enter into a
binding relationship, I will ask when they [the parties] should do so." Id at 1266 (emphasis added).
130. For another discussion of these "sources of contractual incompleteness," see Ayres &
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certainty of the future (bounded rationality)' 3' which makes it difficult to
devise complete contractual arrangements to handle any complex matter
(such as the curtailing of the opportunistic exploitation of precontractual
32
sunk costs). Contractual gaps also derive from "internal impediments"'
or particularized disabilities, such as forgetfulness or lack of education of
the contracting parties. 33 By ignoring the first category of structural impediments to contractual completeness, while nonetheless rationalizing a
law-supplied default rule, Katz and Craswell imply that the second category of personal qualities might be relevant to a law-supplied rule. Ignoring the structural impediments to bargaining underscores the importance
of other impediments, including private internal ones, which hinder contractual completeness. Under this focus, the basis for supplying terms
rests, at least implicitly, on deficiencies affecting the particular actors that
justify supplying terms on distributionist or fairness grounds.
The integration of structural impediments (affecting all parties) into
a justificative model facilitates an alternative basis for supplying
terms-one based on wealth maximization. Given the uncertainty barriers
to private contracting that exist, one can argue that if the law-supplied
rule will be a less costly means of achieving a certain goal, such as reducing or constraining opportunism in precontractual bargaining, than the
total private costs of doing so, "and if it [the law-supplied rule] does this
with a greater net benefit than any private strategy," then it should be
adopted "because it gets the parties through the barriers farther than any
private strategy that the parties would employ, given the budget
34
constraint."
To promote private welfare (efficiency) as the overall goal it is imperative to include structural bargaining impediments in any justification
for law-supplied rules. 3 5 By highlighting certain recurrent aspects of bargaining such as uncertainty, sunk costs, and opportunism, and focusing
on average behavioral characteristics of parties, it becomes feasible to
suggest an efficiency rationale for a law-supplied rule. If structural barriers-such as uncertainty-prevent the parties from adopting explicit conGermer, supra note 33, at 92-94.
131. "Bounded rationality is defined as behavior that is 'intendedly rational, but only limited
so.' " HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISrRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (3d ed. 1976).

132. Remarks on prior draft of this article from Robert N. Strassfeld, Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law (July, 1995) (on file with author).
133. Such disabilities could prompt the parties to forget to include a relevant contractual
provision.
134. E-mall from Ronald J. Coffey to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 101.
135. But see Coleman et al., supra note 33, at 642 (questioning instrumentalism goal).
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tractual devices to control opportunism, and if the parties jointly desire to
control costs and to maximize joint gains from trade, 13 6 it would nonetheless be possible to devise a liability rule supplying terms to control opportunism at less cost than any private contractual devices. The failure to
account for bargaining impediments, and to draw distinctions between
cases of generalized impediments to express contracting to control for
such recurrent problems as opportunism, sunk costs and other cases of
private impediments, lead to a failure of a private welfare justification,
opening the way for distributionist arguments for legal intervention.
C. Flawed Applications of Default Rule Analysis
The failure to justify fully a law-supplied implied commitment in
terms of bargaining impediments, coupled with a failure to distinguish
default rules supplying obligation from those refusing to do so, leads not
only to the methodological failures described above but also to flawed
applications of default rule analysis. It prompts Craswell to propose,
inappropriately, a possible default rule of a term of implied commitment,
not expressly agreed to, based on the efficiency of the reliance 37 under
circumstances of few perceived bargaining impediments.
Craswell's article rationalizes a default rule of an implied commitment for cases of efficient reliance coupled with a pricing scheme under
which promisors price their deals at a sufficiently high level to take care
of a percentage of deals that fail to materialize on which they are liable.138 It protects promisees (and thereby the incentive for promisees to
invest) 139 by implying into all contracts a legal default rule providing legal enforcement for offeror proposals in cases of efficient reliance1 40 Professor Craswell proposes a law-supplied default rule even when he remains confident that the parties can account for the worth of such a
136. See Interview with Ronald J. Coffey (October, 1996); see also WLLAMSON, supra note
21, at 30 (discussing "source of real economic value" that can be obtained through "[h]armonizing

the contractual interface").
137. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 507.
138. See UdLat 496.
139. See id. at 491 (suggesting that if the rule is contrary and "[S]eller is not legally commit-

ted to B[uyer], B[uyer] may have an incentive to choose too low a level of reliance," thus implying
that greater reliance will take place under conditions of enforceability); see also Tom K. Lee & I.P.L.
Png, The Role of Installment Payments in Contractsfor Services, 21 RAND J. EcON. 83, 84 (1990)

(discussing greater marginal efforts in successive portions of a service contract where agreement provides for installment payments "than a contract under which he is paid only at the beginning and
upon completion of the work").
140. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 507 (default rule under which courts are more likely to
"find a commitment when B[uyer] has relied efficiently").,
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legally enforceable commitment 4' by price adjustments. 42 His projected
scheme for promisor pricing of benefits and losses under a legally enforceable default rule assumes that parties can achieve a reciprocal bargain in which "changes in the qualitative aspects of the promise" permit
one party (the promisor) to command "a more valuable return promise
"143

If Craswell is assuming that the price adjustment can be made ex
ante, and that Sellers will offer a legally enforceable commitment to
Buyers at a price calculated to be high enough to compensate Seller "on
the underlying transaction,"' 44 and to provide reimbursement for deals
that fail on which the Seller would be liable for having legally committed, then Craswell's discussion assumes the absence of bargaining impediments. If pricing of the legal commitment is to occur ex ante, with the
commitment and pricing being made simultaneously, then Craswell is assuming that parties will be able to price the commitment as if they would
price an explicitly reciprocal bargained-for transaction. The court should
there take a hands-off attitude and refuse to supply any commitment by
implication. If the parties can price a legally enforceable commitment ex
ante, then the parties could easily have bargained themselves for the legal commitment to facilitate efficient reliance.
If Craswell is assuming that the parties can price the costs and benefits of a legally enforceable commitment ex ante, then his suggested lawsupplied liability rule of an implied commitment does not solve difficulties that the parties themselves might have in adopting private mechanisms for overcoming suboptimal investment or solving opportunistic exploitation of precontractual sunk costs. He therefore cannot justify a legal
default rule that would be preferred over other possible default rules or
141. See id. at 495-96. Craswell states that "S[eller] should be able to adjust the underlying
price to a level that leaves both S[eller] and B[uyer] better off as a result of the commitment ....
The very definition of efficient reliance . . . implies that S[eller] can charge enough to compensate
for her potential losses and still come out ahead." Id. For a discussion of pricing problems, see infra
part IV..
142. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 495-96. Other instances where price is an insufficient instrument include Akerlof's work on lemons. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons":
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488 (1970); see also Hayne E. Leland, Minimum-Quality Standards and Licensing in Markets with Asymmetric Information, in OccUPATIONAL LIcENsuRE AND REGULATION 265, 267 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980); (explaining that price

is an insufficient instrument for differentiating qualitative differences because buyers will be unable
to distinguish differences in quality, causing high quality product sellers to withdraw and causing
"average quality and price [to] fall further.").
143.

Goetz & Scott, supra note 12, at 1285.

144.

Craswell, supra note 1, at 496.
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private solutions to solve such problems. 145 Craswell's suggested liability
rule thus represents not an optimal outcome in itself but rather a starting
point from which parties can bargain to an optimal outcome. By positing
a world in which parties adjust to a law-supplied rule by pricing adjustments with a promisor able to charge enough to cover cases where he is
liable, 46 Craswell undercuts the primary foundation for legal intervention
or inference through a law-supplied rule.
If Craswell is assuming instead that parties will reach the price adjustment later and that Sellers will nonetheless offer a legally enforceable
commitment to Buyers earlier whenever it will induce efficient reliance,
then at least Sellers do not have to settle on the price at a time when
they lack the information to do so. However, under these assumptions it
is not clear what the content of the enforceable commitment should look
like, nor is it clear why the law should supply the commitment in the
form of a default rule. If Craswell is assuming that parties can offer legally enforceable commitments when it is efficient to do so, but must
price the transaction later when more information is available, then in essence he is in effect suggesting a generalized commitment (of an undetermined nature) to be followed later by a transaction that is priced and is
completely contingent as to all matters. If such a scheme is contemplated, then Craswell fails to explain why the parties would fail to agree
explicitly, by contract, to a generalized performance obligation to govern
precontractual negotiations. Craswell's failure to explain why the law
should supply a generalized commitment-in terms of the benefit it serves
for the promisor in inducing sunk costs and reducing promisor uncertainty-also explains why Professor Craswell focuses on the pricing adjustment to make up for a percentage of failed transactions. That focus
assumes that promisors will commit to legally enforceable commitments
and will be compensated by a price on the ultimate transactions that materialize. The interim reliance appears to have no value in itself but is a
wasted investment, the cost of which can be made up amongst successful
transactions. If the value of the interim reliance is recognized, then it is
possible to understand why the putative promisor would be willing to be
bound by a generalized commitment imposing liability for precontractual
145. Moreover, it is not clear that Professor Craswell would even support a law-supplied liability rule since he suggests at one point that Seller will have a private incentive to make proposals
with legal commitments where it is efficient to do so. See id. at 495. "[Ain advance commitment by
S[eller] can lead to a more efficient level of reliance by B[uyer]. In most of those cases, it would
also be in S[eller]'s interest to agree to such a commitment." Id.
146. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 496.
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negotiations; the liability rule would be "compensated" by interim reliance steps by promisees that serve to reduce promisor uncertainty. 147 Had
Craswell more forthrightly recognized the value of such interim reliance
in reducing promisor uncertainty, that value could serve as the subject
matter that was bargainable. When considered in conjunction with the
persuasive barriers to fully contingent contracting, it becomes possible to
explain and support an implied law-supplied generalized commitment in
the form of a performance obligation. 148
If Craswell is assuming that the commitment can be made and a
price agreed on ex ante, then he unrealistically assumes parties have the
information necessary to price at early stages of the transaction; in fact,
the commitment must often be made and the reliance invested before a
price can be agreed on. If Craswell is assuming that the parties can price
the transaction later after an initial enforceable commitment, then his
analysis suffers from its failure to explore the nature of the commitment
and to justify why the law should supply a commitment of a generalized
content 149 rather than relying on other private devices or incentive
schemes. It is incumbent on Craswell to describe the generalized commitment and to justify the law's supplying it,150 by finding it to be the least
costly alternative for achieving optimal reliance.
D. The Failure of the Hypothetical Bargain Rationale
Marginalizing the relevance of bargaining imperfections may explain
another failure of default rule justification in Professor Craswell's and
Katz's articles. Not only do they fail to justify fully the case for a lawsupplied rule of implied obligation but, for related reasons, fail to support
the more limited justification of hypothetical consent on which their proposed respective default rules are partially premised.
While purporting to remain agnostic on whether the possible default
rule of implied obligation should be adopted by courts 1 ' as the optimal
rule, and instead limiting his article to describing judicial outcomes
147. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 673-74 (suggesting that the law should recognize an implied enforceable generalized commitment in precontractual negotiations where the commitment accords with average objectives, there are impediments to its express contractual adoption, and private
alternative devices are more costly); see also Coffey, supra note 12, at 4.
148. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 630-31 (discussing terms of implicit bargain premised on
generalized performance obligation).
149. See WULAJMSON, supra note 21, at 31 (discussing generalized commitments).
150. It would be especially important to justify a law-supplied commitment of a simple generalized performance obligation since the barriers to its adoption would be less formidable.
151. But see supra note 118.
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which appear to be predicated on that rationale, Craswell nonetheless offers a possible rationale for the rule.1 52 That rationale argues that the default rule would be optimal because it would promote the mutual inter-

ests of the parties15 3 and thus accord with a projected hypothetical
bargain. Craswell explains this rule in terms of a "first-best outcome,"
possible where "courts can evaluate B's reliance decision and refuse to

infer a commitment, whenever B[uyer] has chosen an inefficiently high
level of reliance." 54 A default rule promoting efficient reliance would
protect the promisees' reliance investments, and provide them with the
security of a legally enforceable commitment. 55 It would benefit the

promisors by allowing them to benefit directly' 56 or to charge more on an
1 57
ultimate transaction.
Explaining why a specified default rule of implied commitment is
efficient in the sense that it "increases the expected value of the transaction,"'' 5 however, is a significantly different inquiry than one directed at

explaining why the law should supply a default rule which would maximize value. Presumably, if it is indeed in the parties' mutual interests to
have an enforceable commitment' 5 9 both because it would "lead to a
more efficient level of reliance by B[uyer]"' 6 and because "it would
also be in S[eller]'s interest to agree to such a commitment,"' 16 1 analysts
of precontractual reliance must still explain why the parties' self-interest
does not result in expressly agreed to commitments and what, if anything, the law should do when the parties fail to adopt express terms
which would be hypothetically preferred.
152. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 482-86, 507-43, 553; Letter from Richard Craswell to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 5.
153. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 491-97.
154. Id at 494 ("As Goetz and Scott pointed out, such a rule would be similar to a contributory negligence standard in tort law .... ").
155. See id. at 492-93. Such a commitment would protect the "party [who] must perform
before the other" and would otherwise "take[] a huge risk if he or she does so without some assurance that the other party will provide the agreed-on return performance." Id. at 492.
156. See id. at 495. The direct benefits of reliance investment in the context of Red Owl
would include "enabl[ing] Hoffman to run a more profitable franchise ... [that] would have benefitted the franchisor, Red Owl, as well as Hoffman." Id. The direct benefit seems geared to the ultimate transaction rather than to interim benefits in uncertainty reductions which would permit the
promisor to determine the terms of the ultimate transaction.
157. See id. at 496.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 495-97.
160. Id. at 495.
161. Id.
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Second, Craswell's hypothetical bargain rationale is incomplete. To
determine what the parties hypothetically want, since they failed to agree
to it expressly, the decisionmaker must advert to an analytical structure.
That structure must model the central goals of the parties and the barriers
that prevented their reaching an express arrangement. Having done so,
the decisionmaker should ask whether the parties would be able to, as an
alternative to a fully contingent, express bargain governing precontractual
reliance, expressly bargain for specified private incentive schemes for
achieving the parties' goals' 62 or bargain for more generalized sets of
commitments to govern precontractual negotiation. 163 It is only after hypothesizing about parties' goals (a priori) 164 and addressing the barriers
preventing express contractual agreement on all terms, as well as comparing private and law-supplied alternatives, 65 that a decisionmaker can
conclude that the law should adopt a particular default rule with a defined content because it would best serve the parties' hypothetically preferred interests. 66 Since Craswell's article does not examine all of these
issues, he can only suggest default rules without concluding that a particular rule should be adopted because it accords with a hypothetical mutual
bargain (or because it is optimal). 167 Even Craswell's purported agnostic
stance rationalizing a default rule of implied obligation based on an analysis of the parties' mutual self-interests seems problematic. If the default
rule is justifiable because it can be rationalized in terms of the parties'
self-interest and a preferred bargain, then a complete analysis of that selfinterest, including an analysis of what bargaining obstacles prevented the
express adoption of a preferred rule, is required. To conclude that a
Buyer's reliance is or is not efficient and that a liability rule for such reliance would serve the parties' mutual interests requires reference to the
very issues-bargaining impediments, alternative solutions, both public
and private, as well as the parties' behavioral characteristics-which Craswell has avoided. Without integrating those issues, no analyst can con162. See Ronald J. Coffey, Russian Student Exchange Program 1994-1995 Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Sources of Law, at 3 (on file with author) ("Mhe best way to
achieve collectively esteemed goals may be without intervention. By 'private strategies' I mean A's
and B's expanding the express terms of their arrangement, with a system of rewards and punishments (that is, incentives and disincentives).").
163. See infra part VI.
164. See Coffey, supra note 12, at 4.
165. See id.
166. Presumably if the cost of a private solution is cheaper than a law-supplied rule, the state
should decline to intervene with a default rule.
167. See supra part IV.A.
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elude that the law-supplied default rule would be preferred over other solutions. Thus, even Craswell's agnostic rationalization in hypothetical
bargain terms of the described default rule seems weak.
Professor Katz also proposes a liability rule in hypothetical bargain
terms, suggesting that imposing losses on the party with bargaining
power is mutually beneficial because it will promote efficient reliance
which would not otherwise occur.'6 Without his rule, franchisees, for example, would "be reluctant to make investments specific to the franchise
69
relationship."1
Explaining why the default rule Katz proposes would be efficient,
however, fails, as does Craswell's article, to explain why a law-supplied
rule would be necessary. It is not clear why the parties themselves would
not adopt the optimal rule on their own. 70 Ultimately, by proposing a
rule which "[a]ssign[s] losses to the least-cost avoider,"' '7 Katz is suggesting that there be a liability rule making the party with bargaining
power responsible for precontractual losses. 172 Since most precontractual
negotiations litigated do not have an explicit agreement to that effect, the
analysis still begs the fundamental question of why the court should
adopt it as a means of "polic[ing] the efficiency of reliance."' 173
To rationalize a default rule in hypothetical bargain terms, an analyst
must be able to determine whether the overall "net benefit"' 74 will be
greater with legal intervention through the default rule or with "purely
private strategies."'' 75 That determination in turn depends on (1) how parties will react to the different rules, and (2) a comparison of how the parties may privately overcome bargaining imperfections that prevent optimal outcomes with how the rule will "get the parties through the barriers
farther than any private strategy that the parties would employ, given
budget constraints."' 7 6 Craswell's limited hypothetical bargain justification and Katz's optimal reliance rationale for law-supplied rules fail for
the same reasons: both approaches lack a model of human behavior and
168. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1273-77.
169. Id. at 1300.
170. In fact, at one point Katz suggests that such a private agreement would occur, id. at
1274-75, making a law-supplied rule unnecessary.
171. Id. at 1293.
172. See id.
173. Id
174. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 101.
175. Coffey, supra note 162, at 3.
176. E-mail from Ronald J.Coffey to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 101.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:325

bargaining imperfections necessary to rationalize completely rules of legal intervention.
E. The Importance of Bargaining Imperfections in Setting the Initial
Default Rule Given the Relative Difficulties in BargainingAround an Incorrect Default Rule' 77
The foregoing sections have argued that in order to justify the content of the optimal default rule, the law must address bargaining imperfections. An examination of a particular subset of bargaining impediments reinforces that conclusion. Certain impediments suggest that the
content of the initial law-supplied default rule of implied obligation must
conform to the optimal rule because parties may fail to bargain around
an initial nonoptimal default rule.
To the extent that recent authors suggest a legal default rule, without
also addressing the impediments of bargaining around a nonoptimal rule,
the analyses remain incomplete. If impediments exist, they have important implications for the choice of the content of a particular default rule.
The default rule initially adopted must be the optimal one with a particular content and the court should adopt it or nonoptimal results will follow. Yet, because the recent articles minimize the importance of bargaining impediments, they risk the choice of a rule which parties would have
difficulty bargaining around, even if it were nonoptimal.
The existence of impediments will prevent parties not only from ex
ante achieving an explicit contract creating precontractual liability, but
78
also from bargaining around a contrary and therefore nonoptimal rule.
This conclusion can be justified by comparing the relative ability of parties to contract around a default rule of a particular content. Suppose that
the law could adopt a default rule A of no implied obligation or a default
rule B of implied obligation. If you also suppose that parties preferring a
rule B of implied obligation will have greater difficulty contracting
around the rule A of no obligation than will parties who prefer a rule A
of no obligation contracting around a rule B of implied obligation, then
the law should adopt default rule B of an implied obligation on the theory that it will foster a "preferred solution" for all parties. 179
177. I am grateful to Dick Craswell for highlighting the implications of these imperfections
for my overall argument that scholars formulating default rules must account for bargaining imperfections. See Letter from Richard Craswell to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 4.
178. Craswell refers to the relevance of this particular impediment in his letter. See id. at 3.
179. Id. Of course, there is a "second question which is rooted in notions of convention. If it
is harder to bargain around rule B than A, but 90% of buyers and sellers would still prefer rule B, it
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In essence, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner made the foregoing argument in the context of the Hadley v. Baxendale80 damage default rule
discussion. 18 On the one hand, if the law were to adopt a particular default rule, a low damage rule (in effect the Hadley rule), then high-cost
millers who did not want to be bound by that rule would simply contract
out of that rule. 8 2 If the law were to adopt a "non-Hadley, highdamage"' 1 3 default, low-cost millers with an incentive to reveal themselves as low-cost and therefore entitled to pay less in contract shipping
costs, might fail to do So. 184 Under that scenario, the Ayres and Gertner
analysis suggests the law should adopt the rule that parties will have the
85
least difficulty contracting around.

Bargaining imperfections of the kind discussed by Ayres and Gertner
in the Hadley-rule context also have implications for the content of a
contract formation default rule in the context of precontractual reliance.
A default rule of no liability would create difficult costs of contracting
around the rule. Because a party explicitly requesting reimbursement
might be signaling to the other party that he is not as desirable a contracting partner as a party willing to rely without requesting such compensation,8 6 he may fail to request a departure from the no liability demight still be preferable to adopt rule B." Remarks from Robert N. Strassfeld, supra note 132. In
other words, one cannot "only consider bargaining impediment asymmetries;" one must also consider "average preferences." Id. But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33, at 93 (suggesting that "if
the majority is more likely to contract around the minority's preferred default rule (then the minority
is to contract around the majority's rule), then choosing the minority's default may lead to a larger
set of efficient contracts").
180. 9 Ex. 341 (1854).
181. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33.
182. See id. at 110. In addition, of course, high-cost millers under a non-Hadley rule "will not
reveal their true status to the carriers because they would be forced to pay more ... but would gain
no additional coverage ....
The high-damage millers do not mind that carriers take inefficiently low.
levels of precaution because, like all shippers, high-damage millers are fully insured. The lowdamage millers bear the costs of this inefficiency, but are not hurt enough individually to distinguish
themselves contractually." Id..at 111.
183. ld. at 110. As Ayres and Germer explain "[i]f the additional costs of contracting around
the Hadley default rule are sufficiently small, all high-damage millers will contract for the efficient
amount of insurance." Id.
184. See id at 110, 111.
185. See id. at 116 (discussing the importance of "transactional and strategic barriers to contracting around particular default rules").
186. His worth in the eyes of the promisor may be diminished because promisors may be less
willing to contract with parties who refuse to take any preliminary steps without compensation. A request for reliance compensation in advance may signal a shirking propensity. That risk may cause
promisees to refuse to ask for such protection. Economists would refer to the possible reluctance of
such parties to reveal themselves as a "pooling" problem. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33, at100; See also Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis
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fault rule. t87 Similarly, promisors who want a liability rule because it
induces valuable sunk costs will be reluctant to suggest one on their own
because by doing so, they might attract a disproportionate number of
"people" who refuse to invest any reliance without a specific guarantee
of compensation. 8 An individually adopted liability rule will attract people who would not otherwise undertake precontractual acts of reliance
and, therefore may be inveterate "shirkers" who will have a propensity
to shirk in future actions. On the other hand, those who want to depart
from a default rule of liability would not have any difficulty contracting
for an alternative default rule of no liability. Under these circumstances,
the law should adopt a liability rule because parties will have difficulty
achieving desired outcomes because various impediments will prevent
their bargaining around nonoptimal rules.
Of course, it could be argued that since signaling problems may occur with a contrary initial default rule of liability, bargaining around
problems exist with either initial default rule and thus there is no way to
choose between them. If the initial default rule is liability and the seller
seeks a rule of no liability, it too will create signaling problems by suggesting that the seller is not trustworthy or that the seller entertains grave
doubts about the likelihood that the deal will go through. Yet, even if
there are signaling problems associated with contracting around an initial
default rule of liability, that does not necessarily mean the law should respond by adopting a rule whose content is a no liability rule. Difficulties
of bargaining around a liability rule do not raise the same problems as do
difficulties of bargaining around a no liability rule, at least if one takes
account of average preferences. If one posits that a liability rule would
serve the average preferences of parties and that parties will have diffiof Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CALr
INTRDisc. LJ. 335, 372 (1993)
(discussing similar reluctance of parties to reveal their type on the "assumption that the proposal to
include a good faith duty would reveal the actual type of the party making the proposal").
187. Promisors may desire such a rule because it will increase the reliance investment from
promisees which will redound to their benefit by reducing uncertainty.
188. Professor Levine makes this argument in the context of the just cause debate. See David
I. Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection, 9 . LAB.
EcON. 294, 300-01 (1991). A prospective employee may fall to ask for just-cause protection because
of the potential signal it sends to a prospective employer who fears that a worker asking for such
protection will use the just-cause clause as a shield to protect poor performance. A prospective employer may fail to adopt a just-cause clause because of the fear of attracting a "disproportionately
high number of 'lemons' in their applicant pool." Id. at 296. Levine explains this adverse selection
problem as follows: "[W]hen one firm uses just cause, it receives all of the talented shirkers; when
both firms switch to just cause, these workers are evenly distributed." Id. at 300. Thus, even if a
just-cause clause would promote the mutual interest of the parties, it may fall to be adopted.
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culty contracting around the opposite no liability rule, then there may be
reason to supply the liability default rule because most parties will prefer
it and will also have difficulty contracting around a nonoptimal default
rule of no liability. If the optimal rule is liability for most bargainers and
contracting around that optimal rule will be difficult, the law should not
necessarily intervene because the default rule is already optimal. It is
only when the initial default rule (of no liability) is nonoptimal and impediments to bargaining around such rule exist, that a law-supplied default rule (of liability) should be adopted.
Thus, bargaining imperfections should be relevant not only because
making them will allow the legal decisionmaker to assess the optimal legal or hypothetically preferred rile but also because it will allow a legal
analyst to determine which rule should be adopted in light of the difficulty of contracting around a nonoptimal rule.
F

UnrealisticSolutions

A neglect of transaction cost barriers also leads to analytical deficiencies of another kind: it prompts two scholars to suggest unrealistic
solutions to the problem of suboptimal precontractual investment. These
solutions require a high degree of knowledge of the value of various interim acts of reliance even if many obvious impediments make that
knowledge relatively inaccessible or costly to obtain. That neglect
prompts Professor Craswell to suggest an approach that unrealistically requires the parties to price the value of a legally enforceable commitment.
It prompts Wouter Wils to rely on individually negotiated side payments-another unrealistic solution.
Craswell attempts to provide sufficient incentives for precontractual
investment; yet, his suggested solution seems to assume unrealistically
that the parties have enough information to price the ultimate transaction.
The Seller knows what to charge and the Buyer knows what to pay for
such an ultimate commitment. Under this scheme the parties will proceed
as in any bargained-for transaction in which "S[eller] and B[uyer] [are]
better off as a result of the commitment."'' 8 9 Craswell assumes that
promisors have enough information to be certain or, at least, that Sellers
would be willing to abide by a legal commitment in return for at a
higher price' 90 reflecting the higher risk associated with such a commit189. Craswell, supra note 1, at 495.
190. See id. This is Craswell's solution to the problem of underreliance. Other factors, also not
examined, including positive externalities, might also interfere with explicit, voluntary adoption of an
enforceable commitment as well. David Levine, for example, suggests that no one entity will want to
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ment even amidst potentially great uncertainty. 91 If Sellers are bound to
a legally enforceable commitment, then Sellers will adjust their behavior
192
accordingly by charging Buyers more money.
[S]o long as the probability of consummation is sufficiently high to make B[uyer]'s
reliance efficient, S[eller] should still be compensated (in expected value terms) by
the probability that she will be able to collect a higher price on the underlying
transaction .... The very definition of efficient reliance ... implies that S[eller]
can charge enough to compensate for her potential losses and still come out
ahead. 93

Buyers presumably will be willing to pay more money for a legally enforceable promise than for a nonenforceable promise, at least "whenever
the potential benefits of reliance . . . exceed the potential losses from reliance ... .,,194 Craswell's scheme apparently assumes that efficient outcomes will actually be achieved through parties' private pricing adjustments to a legally enforceable commitment imposing liability for efficient
precontractual reliance. The absence of perceived impediments to pricing
suggests that parties should be able to reach an efficient outcome under
such an enforceability scheme. Yet his pricing scheme does not take account of the bargaining situation where information needs to be developed incrementally and in which promisors may not be ready to price the
ultimate transaction at a time when they nevertheless need to encourage
precontractual reliance.
The failure to grapple with precontractual bargaining difficulties
causes Professor Craswell to overlook the barriers that might interfere
with the parties successfully pricing and proposing a legally enforceable
commitment. The very same factors that would potentially prevent voluntary assumption of legal obligations ex ante would also potentially interfere with parties' efforts through pricing to react to a law-supplied rule.
Without knowledge about the probabilities of the transaction occurring-not possible early in precontractual negotiations-Sellers may not be
willing to propose legally enforceable commitments which must be
priced.
offer an enforceable commitment of just cause because that entity will then attract all, or a disproportionate number of, the "talented shirkers." Levine, supra note 188, at 294-95.
191. But see infra part V (suggesting that sellers might wish to pursue a different option in
light of uncertainty).
192. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 495.
193. Id. at 496.
194. Id. at 491.
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Even if Craswell does not necessarily contemplate agreement on the
price term at the point in time where Seller is deemed legally committed
and instead contemplates later pricing, his scheme is built on some questionable assumptions. First, Seller-promisors may not yet know if "the
probability of consummation is sufficiently high to make B[uyer]'s reliance efficient."' 95 Sellers may not be willing to commit, even in a generalized fashion, because the probability that they will be able to charge
enough on successful deals to be compensated for the deals that fail may
not be high enough. Thus, the Seller-promisors may be reluctant to offer
a legal commitment, and yet they need to induce promisee investment
reliance.
Second, even if the price term can be settled later, Seller-promisors
who are highly uncertain of whether a particular transaction will succeed
will not necessarily be willing to commit to a legally enforceable commitment ex ante on the assumption that they as Sellers can charge a high
enough price on deals actually consummated to pay damage awards on
non-consummated deals involving liability. Such a prediction rests on
several questionable assumptions. First, if the proportion of nonconsummated deals is sufficiently disproportionate to the actual number
of deals consummated, the sellers may not be able to collect enough on
those isolated deals to cover their liability on non-consummated deals.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the group of promisee-buyers whose
deals are consummated would necessarily be willing to pay a higher
price to compensate the Seller for other non-related deals that fail to materialize. Finally, the pricing scheme rests on an assumption that Sellers
will necessarily be repeat players, able to spread the necessary premium
price among a large number of promisees, which will not necessarily be
true.
The absence of perceived bargaining impediments prompts Wouter
Wils to rely on another difficult-to-achieve private mechanism for achieving optimal outcomes and to reject the need for a law-supplied liability
rule. 96 Under Wils' scheme, intervention would arguably be unnecessary
because the nonrelying party would have a private incentive to negotiate
a side payment to induce efficient reliance.' 97 "[I]t will always be in the
other party's interest to pay part of the reliance cost so as to induce the
195.
196.
mation is
a liability
197.

Id at 496.
See Wils, supra note 1, at 99 (rejecting a liability rule for induced reliance where inforsymmetric); id. at 100, 101 (rejecting a mandatory contribution rule); id. at 102 (rejecting
rule for ending negotiations); id. at 110 (restricting liability to cases of misrepresentation).
See Wils, supra note 1, at 99.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:325

acting party to rely."'' 98 The side payment will make the relying party account for the whole surplus and not just the private surplus accruing to
the acting party from the reliance investment. 99 Such a side payment
could thus theoretically solve the externality problem.2 0 Arguably, the
side payment solution should be theoretically available to solve the problem of opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs.20' Parties could negotiate
side payments to protect against such exploitation. 2°2
In suggesting side payments to overcome the externality problem,
Wils has ignored the transaction costs of negotiating such side payments,
arguing that "transaction costs are not prohibitive" 20 3 where "parties are
already involved in negotiations with each other." 204 "Given our assumption of symmetric information, however, it is highly unlikely that efficient reliance action will not be taken." 205
The side payment solution of Wils' analysis to the overall problem
of "suboptimal investment" ignores important transaction cost issues inherent in incremental bargaining. Moreover, Wils fails to take account of
problems with side payment strategies, thus failing to consider why and
how parties might prefer to adopt different strategies to overcome the
barriers to optimal investment. First, he ignores the real barriers that exist
to subdividing performance into parcels that have equal economic value
to each side to facilitate a trade at prices acceptable to both.206 These barriers presumably would interfere with private side payment solutions to
externality problems and with other privately negotiated incentive
schemes 20 7 to solve the opportunism problem. The achievement of multiple, particularized subbargains covering specific instances of reliance investment would entail very high transaction costs of negotiations whereas
performance promises of a more generalized content would not be as
198. Id.
199. See id. at 98-99.
200. See id.
201. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 492.
202. See Wils, supra note 1, at 99.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Interview with Ronald J. Coffey, supra note 80.
207. These alternative private incentive schemes (drawn from the agency context) for curbing
opportunism problems in precontractual bargaining are detailed in Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 65760. See generally Michael C. Jensen & Yilliam H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); David M. Kreps, In
Honor of Sandy Grossman, Winner of the John Bates Clark Medal, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 111, 128-31
(1988) (discussing "optimal incentive scheme[s]").
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costly.208 The transaction costs are likely to be particularly severe in the
context of incremental bargaining involving a series of reliance sunk cost
investments that may be requested by a putative promisor. When promisees are confronted with a series of investment reliance decisions over
time, it would be costly for the parties to negotiate these side payments
to induce reliance. A law-supplied liability rule for these precontractual

costs may save the parties the costs of negotiating these side payments
seriatim. The parties may prefer such a rule to save them the costs of negotiating private side payments or the costs of negotiating private incentive schemes and thereby conserve the surplus that will be available for
distribution to the parties.? 9
Although Richard Craswell and Wouter Wils rely on different
schemes for achieving optimal outcomes, with Craswell relying on a lawsupplied rule and Wils relying on private side payment schemes, both
scholars remain confident that parties can easily reach a price that
"leaves both S[eller] and B[uyer] better off as a result of the commitnient. ' ' 210 The difficulty with Craswell's scheme is that it may require the
promisor to commit to a price for the ultimate transaction before the
promisor has adequate information or at least to make calculations about
the probability of the transaction being consummated before enough in-

formation is available. Wils' scheme similarly entails a high degree of
knowledge because it requires the promisor to price the worth of individual acts of precontractual reliance. Thus, because of the failure to confront transaction costs inherent in precontractual bargaining, recent ana208. See Interview with Ronald J. Coffey, supra note 80. The content of the more generalized
obligation could consist of a one-sided obligation by the promisor to exercise reasonable efforts to
facilitate our reaching the point where we can be more specifically reciprocal in orthodox categories
of time, price, etc. See also Coffey, supra note 96, at 156 (discussing generalized performance obligations for agents); Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 672-73 (discussing content of generalized performance obligations). A further question arises then as to why the side payment agreements could not be
of a more generalized content. As one of my colleagues suggested, the generalized content might be
as follows: "If you take the necessary preliminary steps, I will not withdraw my offer while you perform and will reimburse you up to ...
_% of reasonable costs not to exceed - dollars." Robert N.
Strassfeld, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, Comments, July, 1995 (on file with
author). The content of such a generalized obligation and the reasons why a law-supplied rule might
still be preferred over privately agreed to generalized express agreements are explored in Kostritsky,
supra note 2, at 630-31.
209. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 665. The conservation of the surplus under a mandated
rule helps to justify the adoption of the rule under a hypothetical bargain standard. Presumably both
parties will prefer a rule which conserves surplus making it available for joint distribution over rules
or private mechanisms which add costs without achieving more optimal reliance.
210. Craswell, supra note 1, at 495; see Wils, supra note 1, at 99 (finding that side payments
can be priced).
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lysts' suggested methods for promoting precontractual reliance are
misguided and unrealistic. They require the parties to price either the ultimate transaction or to fractionalize the value of individual, interim reliance steps. Both pricing schemes are costly.
G.

Neglecting the Information and Uncertainty Problem

1. Understanding the Information and Uncertainty Problems in
PrecontractualBargaining
The neglect of bargaining impediments, including the uncertainty
problem, has prompted a number of analytical difficulties, including the
failure to justify fully the suggested default rule, the misapplications of
the default rule, and the proposals for unrealistic solutions to suboptimal
investment. Much of the prior analysis of reliance investment or promissory decisions has relied on a false paradigm21 and on a static model of
bargaining in which either: (1) no further information needs to be developed because the details of the transaction are known (as in a spot market trade); (2) the reliance investment plays no role in reducing uncertainty for the other party; or (3) the promisees make reliance decisions in
isolation from the promisor, or promisors make decisions on whether to
contract, and if so on what terms, in isolation from the promisee. Even
prior or current scholarship that has either implicitly or explicitly recognized the existence of informational and uncertainty problems affecting
precontractual negotiations has failed to take sufficient account of different aspects of the uncertainty problem, and has failed to analyze systematically all strands of the uncertainty problem. Although various strands
of the uncertainty problem have been separately analyzed, much of prior
scholarship has failed to identify adequately different aspects of the uncertainty problem, instead developing a model and solution that is particularized and premised on one permutation of uncertainty. 212 Because of
that narrow focus, restricted to a particular type of uncertainty that is not
soluble by further promisee investment, at least some of this prior reli211. See supra note 45.
212. For example, Professor Craswell's treatment of precontractual investigation in Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal PrecautionProblem, 17 J. LEGAL STuD. 401 (1988), is premised on
a certain type of uncertainty about future events, an uncertainty which apparently cannot be mitigated by reliance investment from the other party. The particular uncertainty concerns future events,
such as the closing of the Suez Canal. See id. at 407. Such uncertainty might be reduced by more
precontractual investigation by the putative offeror, but it is not the kind of uncertainty which is susceptible to reduction by promisee reliance investment. Because of the overly narrow view of the uncertainty strand, other kinds of uncertainties are neglected.
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ance scholarship focuses unduly on improving one party's information in
the bargaining process without devoting sufficient attention to the interactive relationship between reliance by one party and its contribution to a
reduction in uncertainty for the other party. In one example, Professor
Craswell's "stylized sequence of events" assumes that Seller will be
gathering information to decide on contracting before Buyer (the other
party) has relied. 213 Thus, there is a failure to consider how the uncertainties affecting the party deciding to contract may be mitigated by early reliance from the putative offeree. Professor Katz's study of precontractual
reliance decisions and the uncertainty problem examines how optimal reliance decisions are made in view of a steadily declining role of uncertainty affecting the offer.214 While recognizing the existence of an uncertainty problem, Katz's model for judging the optimal timing of reliance is
based on improved information resulting from delay itself rather than
from a reliance step itself reducing uncertainty for the other party (the
21 5
promisor).
Thus, both Katz and Craswell's models are flawed because they underestimate the importance promisee reliance plays in reducing uncertainties for putative offerors. Even scholarship which implicitly recognizes
the interactive effect between promisee reliance and promisor uncertainty, 21 6 fails to address adequately transaction cost problems inherent in
suggested solutions to the uncertainty problem. While recognizing the existence of various precontractual uncertainties, prior authors' treatments,
by focusing only on particular strands of the uncertainty problem, suggest
solutions that are too narrowly tailored and ignore other important manifestations of the uncertainty problem requiring a different solution. Moreover, much of this prior scholarship on informational uncertainty focuses
on improving one party's calculations about how to make optimal decisions without focusing sufficiently on the interactive connection between
213. Id. at 406.
214. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1268-69.
215. The offeror's uncertainty about whether he will lose or win on the offer if he performs is
reduced simply by the passage of time. As Katz explains, "[a]t the outset of the period, in Week 1,
the chance that she [the subcontractor] cannot perform is 20%. By Week 5, she will know for certain
Id. at 1268. In
whether or not she can perform. The uncertainty is resolved at a constant rate ....
this example, the offeree (general contractor) does not rely until the offeror's certainty about her own
performance is more certain. Yet, the offeror formulates the offer and resolves uncertainty about
whether the offer will be profitable or whether she will regret the offer, see Goetz & Scott, supra
note 33, at 267 n.10 (discussing regret contingencies), without regard to reliance investments by the
offeree.
216. Wils recognizes that promisors may desire promisees to take interim steps which they
will find it worthwhile to pay for. See Vils, supra note 1, at 99.
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interim reliance by promisees and a reduced uncertainty for putative
promisors. 2 7 Such scholarship is premised on a static model of promisee
reliance calculations which pays insufficient attention to the informational
exchange problem. 2 18 That scholarship seeks to resolve the optimality of
the reliance timing question without regard to the possible external bene219
fits to the promisor.
a.

"Incentives to Acquire Better Information"220

Professor Craswell recognizes that "if at a time to the parties don't
know very much about the likelihood that a proposed transaction will
ever be consummated, they may be able to improve their information by
taking steps to investigate the relevant probabilities." 221 In prior related
work Professor Craswell examines the effect of various damage measures
on one party's incentives to gather some information about the likelihood
of events that "would make it unprofitable . . .to perform ...."2
While looking at the isolated problem of how damage measures
under various market conditions, including conditions of perfect monopoly, perfect competition, and bilateral monopoly, affect one party's incentive to acquire more information about the future, Craswell's examination
of the informational uncertainty problem purports to provide the basis for
a legal damage rule that will promote optimal precontractual information
gathering. 2' 3 Yet his "stylized sequence" 22 4 of events appears to be predicated on a static model of information gathering in which Sellers gather
information and perform tests in isolation without reference to the other
party's possible reliance expenditures as a means of mitigating uncertainty. For example, in Craswell's description of the contracting process,
a potential seller and buyer "decide whether they are willing to contract
and (if so) at what price" 2 5 before "B[uyer] turns down all other offers
and spends whatever he is going to spend in reliance on S[eller]'s prom217. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 1,at 1268-69 (recognizing existence of an uncertainty problem
but assuming that uncertainty relates to events, such as promisor's job availability, which can be resolved by time alone).
218. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
219. See id.
220. Letter from Richard Craswell to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 6.
221. Id.
222. Craswell, supra note 212, at 406.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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ise." 6 That conceptualization of the bargaining process separates the effects of law on "the parties' incentives to gather information" 227 from the
"effect on . . .the level of reliance expenditures. ' ' 228 This article disagrees, viewing the reliance expenditures and the information gathering
preliminary to the formulation of offers as inextricably linked.
The analytical separation of these issues can be explained by Craswell's views on the source of the uncertainty faced by putative promisors
who are nonacting (non-relying) parties. Examples of uncertainties affecting potential offeror Sellers include a strike by employees of the manufacturer, the closing of the Suez Canal, or an arithmetical bidding error.229
Some of these events are exogenous, such as the Suez Canal; others,
such as the bid error, concern matters internal to a potential offeror
which will affect the chances that the probability of performance costs
are high or low and thus whether the transaction will be profitable or
not.210 What is lacking in these examples is a conception of uncertainty
that could be mitigated by reliance expenditures from the other party. For
example, uncertainty (for the seller who is having goods shipped) about
the exogenous event of the Suez Canal closing will not be reduced by reliance expenditures of a party-a buyer-who buys these goods. The
buyer's reliance-such as turning down other opportunities to purchase the
goods elsewhere-is unlikely to affect the uncertainty concerning the closing of the Suez Canal.
The Craswell treatment of information gathering incentives is too
narrow because it excludes the type of uncertainty susceptible to clarification by actions from the other party. Craswell's conceptual treatment of
the information problem from PrecontractualInvestigation as an Optimal
PrecautionProblem231 continues in his current article. The current article
similarly ignores the interactive effect between promisee reliance and the
' 32
formulation of offers by promisor. By using a "paradigmatic case"
premised on a promisee investment in machinery which is designed to
ensure more efficient processing but which does not of itself serve to reduce promisor uncertainty, Craswell has continued to exclude an important class of cases.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id. at 407.
ld.
See id. at 409.
See id.at 406.
See Craswell, supra note 212.
See supra note 45.
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b. Acquiring Information by Delay 233
Other scholarship has ignored the interactive effect between promisee reliance and the reduction of uncertainty, but in a different way.234 It
examines the informational uncertainty by looking at the contribution that
delay itself can make to the reduction of uncertainty, thus ignoring the
contribution which factors other than delay can make toward that reduction.235 Under this approach "the parties' limited information should lead
them to delay their reliance until some later time when they are better
236
able to judge whether reliance would be efficient.'
This scholarship, including Professor Katz's, has not ignored the uncertainty problem. It has analyzed "how long the parties ought to delay
as a question of whether reliance at any particular time is efficient (compared to delaying the reliance instead to some later time), in light of associated costs and benefits.''3 There are presumably both costs (more
expensive reliance)238 and benefits (reduced uncertainty) to waiting.23 9
Several difficulties with the Katz "delay model"' 240 nevertheless impair its ability to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on the content
of the law-supplied obligation in the precontractual period and on the necessity of a law-supplied obligation. First, the postulated trade-off
calculus for the promisee seems designed to be made in isolation. Because it looks solely at242the costs and benefits of waiting24 ' in terms of
"expected net profits"
on the overall transaction without taking into
account the possible benefit to the offeror from an early investment in reliance,243 the calculation cannot determine if reliance is optimal and may
underestimate the need for a law-supplied liability rule. Second, to the
extent the delay model focuses on the post-offer situation, it ignores the
233. See Letter from Richard Craswell to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 7.
234. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 1.
235. See id.
236. Letter from Richard Craswell to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 7.
237. Id. at 8.
238. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1267 (because "[Il]ast minute production is more expensive").
239. See id. at 1268 (discussing benefits from waiting for more information and minimizing
regret costs). "The costs of regret are, in Goetz and Scott's terminology, the detrimental aspect of
reliance." Id.
240. Katz's model is a delay model because it calculates the costs and benefits of waiting.
241. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1268 (comparing the costs and benefits of waiting to contract).
242. Id. at 1270.
243. This results in an externality because a benefit to the promisor that is external to the
promisee is not taken account of in the promisee's calculation. See also Wils, supra note 1, at 98
("The acting party, however, only takes into account the part of the increased surplus which she expects to receive. Spontaneously, a party will thus rely less often than socially desirable.").
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problem of informational exchanges preceding the offer which lie at the
heart of precontractual negotiations. Third, in rejecting the need for a
law-supplied rule of offer irrevocability 244 in the subcontracting context
by focusing on the ill-desired incentive effects of a single rule-the binding option 245-Katz ignores the incremental nature of bargaining which
could call for a different content in a law-supplied default rule.
Focusing on the beneficial, "productive" 2 46 aspects of an early investment which will save the offeree money by avoiding "more expensive" "last minute production"2 47 in the cost/benefit analysis of early
versus late reliance ignores the potential benefit to the offeror from an
early investment of reliance that is not productive in the sense of saving
money on the overall deal or of directly increasing the profitability of the
deal for the offeree. Under this restrictive view, the offeree is supposed
to weigh the probability of reaching a deal with the offeror and the projected profits of the transaction against the cost of the investment as a
way of arriving at "expected net profits" on the transaction. 2 "
Several difficulties, all of which tend to minimize the importance of
interim reliance in reducing promisor uncertainty, impair Katz's model
for approaching precontractual reliance efficiency issues. First, Katz's calculation apparently contemplates that the probability of the parties not
reaching a deal is not affected by interim reliance steps by the offeree or
promisee but rather by other events outside of the control of the offeree.
Katz's example focuses on uncertainty of the subcontractor offeror about
its potential availability for a new job given uncertainties about the completion of the offeror's prior job. That uncertainty may affect when it is
appropriate to rely. This calculation thus confines the analyst's concerns
to steps which the offeree can take which will increase gains from trade
on the overall transaction. By focusing exclusively on how "productive"
an investment is "that can make the bargain more valuable" 249 and how
much it will enhance profitability,2so the Katz article may suggest that
244. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1276 (rejecting the Drennan rule of irrevocability at least
where the general contractor has the bargaining power).
245. See id. at 1276 (pointing out "an early option is a sure loser for the subcontractor without bargaining power").
246. Id. at 1267.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 1269-70. Discounted profits reflect the amount of projected profits reduced by
some percentage representing the possibility that the deal will not be consummated.
249. Id. at 1267.
250. The profitability is conceptualized in teams of "increas[ing] the gains from trade by allowing the parties to rely." Id.
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early reliance is not efficient because it does not directly enhance such
profitability.251 It thus does not allow for the possibility that the efficiency of reliance investment could be different if it could be shown that
the reliance reduced promisor uncertainty. The taking of such reliance
steps may reduce promisor uncertainty and enhance the deal's
probability, thereby making what would otherwise appear to be inefficient reliance to be efficient reliance. By focusing on types of promisor
uncertainty, such as the offeror's availability for the transaction, that are
not affected by promisee reliance actions but by other independent and
unrelated events, Katz's calculation tends to discount the benefit to the
offeror from early reliance and thus to underestimate the need for protecting such early interim reliance.
In focusing on the post-offer calculations of reliance, Katz's delay
model ignores the basic problem of informational exchange in the
precontractual process and uncertainty in decisionmaking which should
inform the debate surrounding the effect reliance should have on the revocability of an offer and on whether legal intervention through lawsupplied rules is necessary. The post-offer focus falsely assumes that offers can be formulated without interim reliance. Katz discusses two different scenarios, both of which ignore the informational exchange problem.212 In the first example the subcontractor has the bargaining power,
and, in the other example, the general contractor has the bargaining
power.25 3 In the imagined scenario of subcontractor dominance Katz
posits that it would be appropriate to impose "liability for reliance damages. 12 4 "She [the subcontractor-offeror] will therefore have an incentive
to control these reliance costs by delaying her offer . . . This position
will induce her to wait to make an offer until the very moment it is socially optimal to rely . . . . "5 In another instance, Professor Katz assumes that offers can be formulated without regard to reliance.256 Katz
envisions the possibility of the offeror's delaying the offer and of offering an option "made binding"' 57 which will cause the offeree "to rely
immediately,"251 and therefore contemplates that an offeror may be ex251. See id. at 1268 ("Deciding to enter into a contract too early, when the level of uncertainty is high and the productive value of reliance low, results in too much reliance.").
252. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1273-74.
253. See id.
254. Id. at 1273.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 1275.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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pected to formulate an offer before the offeree relies. Where the general
contractor has the bargaining power, and subcontractor offers are binding
when made, "[rational subcontractors will tend to avoid making offers
until the last possible moment when the uncertainty . . . will be
resolved." z 9
The difficulty with these scenarios is that they falsely assume that
the subcontractor's offer can be formulated before the offeree has relied.
Yet, in fact, if the uncertainty problem faced by the subcontractor (of being unable to commit to a fully contingent contract because of the uncertainty as to the award of the overall contract),260 is fully accounted for
along with the benefits which the offeror can derive from interim reliance
of the general contractor (in positioning itself to later commit to a fully
contingent contract with the subcontractor), then the difficulty of delaying
the offer simply to control reliance costs becomes problematic, particularly if the analysis is to be extended to other situations beyond the subcontracting context. In Hoffman-like cases and other incremental bargain
contexts where "time and effort are needed to decide on the bargain,"'6
it seems less than optimal for the offeree to rely immediately upon the
making of the offer. Thus, the analysis must start earlier in the process
and examine preliminary negotiations before the offer is made. Explanations that focus on the incentives and reliance calculations of the offeree
in a post-offer situation without simultaneously examining the question of
how the offeror and the offeree should be encouraged (with legal rules)
to take sunk costs steps that are valuable to the other party, and that they
might not take without a legal rule or some form of negotiated private
payment, ignores the incentive effect between reliance and sunk costs
and the formulation of the offer.262 Instead of focusing on when an offer
should be made and when it is optimal to invest reliance costs, perhaps it
would be better to think of the bargaining process as an incremental one
that progresses over time. The problem is whether to devise a legal rule
that will facilitate the investment of sunk costs, or to leave the matter to
the parties to negotiate payments that will induce the sunk costs. Part of
the explanation for Professor Katz's ignoring the interconnection between
sunk costs and the formulation of an offer is that the reliance steps with
259. Id. at 1276.
260. See infra part X.
261. Katz, supra note 1, at 1267.
262. See Lee & Png, supra note 139, at 95 (suggesting that reliance investments would be affected and increased by payment in installments and a legal rule mandating such interim payments
will be implied by English courts in the absence of a contrary agreement, presumably to enhance
such investment).
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which he concerns himself involve steps that do not necessarily have
value in helping the offeror to formulate an offer.2 63 In order to encourage a party to invest sunk costs which may be helpful to the offeror
in later formulating a fully contingent bargain, it may be helpful to make
the promisor responsible for those sunk costs. This would be particularly
appropriate where those sunk costs were sought and can reduce uncertainty, barriers to express contracting exist, and the promisor has failed to
warn the promisee of a change in its willingness to contract. Without that
liability rule, the offeree may not invest the sunk costs necessary to move
the deal forward. Katz does not consider the possibility that there may be
an alternative to binding the offeror to a fully contingent contract-one
that will help to offset the sunk costs of the other party and thus facilitate reliance. Therefore, rather than relying on the offeree to trade off the
advantages of early bargaining and late bargaining, one opts for a rule
that allows the parties "the time and effort ... needed to decide on the
bargain."264
c. Reliance in Cases of Symmetrical Knowledge265
A third strand of scholarship has focused on cases where "the parties have gathered whatever information they can-but ... their infornation is still at least somewhat imperfect, and . . . a point has been
reached where it doesn't pay for the parties to delay or investigate further. ' 266 While adverting to the uncertainty problem, such scholarship
may suggest that a law-supplied rule imposing precontractual ability
would be unnecessary because of the incentive to engage in side agreements.2 67 This strand of scholarship, while recognizing the uncertainty
problem, ignores the very real obstacles to private solutions to the underinvestment problem. Thus, it cannot explain why a law-supplied rule
might be needed or preferable.

263. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1267. Katz is arguably contemplating steps that may involve
the beginning of contract performance.
264.

Id.

265.

See Wils, supra note 1, at 97 (focusing on "case where information is symmetric").

266. Letter from Richard Craswell to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 9 (describing
"[r]elying when information is imperfect but symmetric").
267.

See Wils, supra note 1, at 99.
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d. Asymmetrical Uncertainty and Reliance268
Commentators have not ignored the asymmetrical strand of the uncertainty problem. Wils has addressed dual scenarios of unequal information, one in which "the acting party has superior information" 269 and the
other in which the "acting party has inferior information." 270 While such
strands of the uncertainty problem are both important, Wils' treatment of
reliance27 ' induced in such contexts improperly confines the need for a
law-supplied liability rule to cases of a misrepresentation of the "likelihood that the deal will go through ...."272 He continues to find no need
for a liability rule in cases of symmetrical uncertainty. The conceptualizations of informational problems are too rigid and unrealistically assume
that liability should be restricted to situations in which one party has perfect information about the possibility of a deal before any reliance action
is taken by the other party.
Under Wils' treatment of the case where "the acting party has inferior information," he posits that "at the time of the reliance decision, the
acting party is less well informed than the other party... [and] that only
the other party knows how likely it is that the negotiations will eventually succeed." 273 Under that scenario, Wils assumes that the more informed party may have a predisposition to "try and succeed in making
2
the acting party believe that this probability is higher than it really is."
74
Wils' liability rule would make the acting party liable for such misrepresentations and prevent cases of inefficient reliance induced at the behest
of the nonacting party with perfect knowledge.
Although it is possible to imagine a scenario of that kind, in many
cases which are not simple spot market trades but which involve the development of information incrementally over time, rarely will the nonacting party have perfect knowledge of the estimates of a deal's probable
success. Instead, many cases will involve at least some uncertainty about
the probability of success which could be mitigated by an acting party's
268. See Letter from Richard Craswell to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 9.
269. Wils, supra note 1, at 99.
270. Id. at 104.
271. By reliance, Wils refers to "actions taken by parties in anticipation of the deal in negotiation, which increase the expected surplus from the deal, and the costs and benefits of which fall on
the same acting party." Id. at 97.
272. Id. at 105.
273. Id. at 104.
274. Id. Professor Katz also regards the "incentive to tryto induce early reliance by misrepresenting the risk," Katz, supra note 1, at 1289, as a problem of asymmetric information which justi-

fies a liability rule.
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sunk costs. Thus, requests for reliance investments may be induced in order to reduce that uncertainty rather than to induce inefficient reliance action. The putative promisor often remains ignorant of the ultimate
probabilities of success or of the ultimate terms without the reliance investment. Thus, Wils' one example of an appropriate liability rule seems
designed to address an almost nonexistent case where one party has perfect knowledge of the success or failure of the progress of negotiations
before any reliance investment is made and systematically misleads the
other party.
In the other imagined scenario of asymmetrical uncertainty, Wils describes a case where the "acting party has the superior information" concerning "how much this action increases the surplus from the deal." 275 In
such a case, the acting party has an incentive to dissemble on how much
the reliance will increase the surplus to induce the nonacting party to pay
even in cases where payment was not really required because it was
"worthwhile for the acting party to undertake on her own motion." 276
Under these circumstances, the nonacting party's awareness of the acting
party's incentive to distort may cause the nonacting party to refrain from
paying reliance costs even if such payment is needed to induce efficient
277
reliance, thereby causing suboptimal investment.
Wils' treatment of this version of uncertainty too summarily rejects
the need for a law-supplied rule. He rejects a mandatory contribution rule
because courts would "need an unrealistically high degree of information." 278 Arguably, however, the information needed to determine
whether contribution should be awarded is no more difficult to administer
than determining what incentive effect the Learned Hand formula would
have on negligence determinations.
Wils' other ground for rejecting a liability rule in this context is also
flawed because it assumes a liability rule will "decrease the efficiency of
the reliance decision, by insuring the acting party against the risk that the
deal will not go through. 27 9 This rejection of a liability rule is premised
on the notion that compensation will cause excess reliance.30 This analy275. Wils, supra note 1, at 99.
276. Id. at 100.
277. See id. at 101.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 102.
280. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 1, at 494 (referring to the excess reliance problem.) Insuring promisee's sunk costs poses a sort of classic moral hazard problem. Once insured against loss,
promisees may fail to take suitable precautions against loss just as an insured policy holder may fail
to do so. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 21, at 47 (discussing the "[flailure of insureds to behave in a
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sis fails to acknowledge that a liability rule could nevertheless be efficient by providing the putative promisor with information needed to determine the contours of the ultimate bargain. Under such circumstances,
the liability rule could be efficient even if the calculation by the promisee would suggest that the reliance would still be inefficient.
In the one other case where Wouter Wils is willing to impose a liability rule, he does so in the context of a case where the "acting party
' 2
has superior information"2' and there is "anticipatory performance"
involving "actions which are taken by negotiating parties in anticipation
of the deal, which increase the surplus from the deal, and the cost and
benefits of which do not fall on the same party. ' ' 2 3 In these circumstances, Wils is willing to entertain a restitution rule imposing on the
party who benefits from the anticipatory performance the obligation "to
restitute the scrap value."' 284 The difficulty with this approach is that he
excludes a restitution rule from cases where the information is symmetric. Thus, cases where there is shared informational symmetrical uncertainty will be improperly excluded from liability or restitution rules. Another difficulty with this approach is that it excludes interim reliance
steps which do not actually yield a scrap value.
While not ignoring the uncertainty problem, the prior treatments either (1) ignore the interactive effect between increases in one party's reliance and the other party's reduced uncertainty, (2) ignore the external
benefit to the promisor from the promisees' investment in the reliance
calculation tradeoffs between early and delayed reliance, (3) focus on a
post offer situation thus ignoring the informational uncertainties in the
pre-offer process, (4) fail to consider alternative content for a lawsupplied rule of implied obligation, or (5) improperly exclude liability or
restitution rules.
By focusing on these neglected aspects of uncertainty, the legal
decisionmaker could devise a law-supplied rule, the content of which
would promote optimal reliance in the precontractual period given the
bargaining constraints, provide appropriate incentives for reliance investment, and account for the interactive effect between promisee investment
and reduced promisor uncertainty.
fully responsible way and take appropriate risk-mitigating actions").
281. Wils, supra note 1, at 112.
282. Id. at 114.
283. Id. at 110-11.
284. Id. at 114.
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Understanding the Information Neglect Problem

The discounting of the informational uncertainty problem in the current literature may derive from the underlying perception of the paradigmatic precontractual reliance case as a discrete and static transaction in
which interim reliance and sunk costs do not affect the nature of the ultimate exchange which takes place. 2 5 The example used by Craswell to illustrate the "paradigmatic" case 286 involves the sinking of costs under a
contract, but the sunk costs do not seem to affect the nature of the ultimate deal. Buyer has ordered widgets from Seller as well as a machine
which "will allow him to process the widgets more efficiently."' 287 Buyer
risks investing sunk costs which will be wasted if the deal fails to materialize,2sB but in Craswell's paper the investment of the sunk costs does
not provide information to Seller about how the sale of the machine
should be priced. Professor Katz's example shares the same static quality.
He focuses on a sale of goods in which the tradeoff is between
"[w]aiting until the last moment to trade" 9 and early bargaining. As
with Professor Craswell's example, the sunk costs do not seem related to
a potential reduction of uncertainty for the promisor. If the Seller waits
to sell and ships the goods to market without an advance sale, a reship285. For a discussion of the paradigm, see supra note 45. The transactional paradigm contemplated by Professor Craswell differs from the truly discrete one-shot transaction because the case
does involve some investment of sunk costs into a machine. That investment makes the transaction a
more complex one than a truly discrete transaction with "no significant past relations nor likely future relations." Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical,Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854-857 (1978). Moreover,
the investment is premised on a continuing supply of widgets for processing in order to recoup the
sunk costs. For literature which explodes the myth that the discrete transaction is central to contract
law and broadens our notions of exchange to include continuing relationships over time, see id.; see
also Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 483;
William C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L. Rav. 545;
Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REv. 2005 (1987).
The paradigm contemplated by Professor Craswell, however, still has static or discrete elements because the investment of the sunk costs seems to take place at a distinct moment in time and to be
divorced from the continuing relations and incremental bargaining between Buyer and Seller.
286. Craswell, supra note 1, at 484.
287. Id. at 490. Professors Goetz and Scott also discuss beneficial reliance in too narrow a
manner by focusing on such reliance as "adaptive gain" which will allow an individual to "achieve
a higher intertemporal level of satisfaction" because of advance notice of a promise. Goetz & Scott,
supra note 12, at 1267.
288. As Craswell explains sunk costs: "If S[eller] does not deliver the widgets, B[uyer]'s investment will be wasted, and B[uyer] will be worse off than if he had not purchased the machine."
Craswell, supra note 1, at 490.
289. Katz, supra note 1, at 1267.
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ment at the Seller's expense may be required if the deal fails. 29° "If shipping costs are high and the chances of not finding a buyer are significant, it is better to negotiate before any goods are shipped. ' 291 On the
other hand, if the parties enter a contract too early, later developments
could pose disadvantages for the parties, and they may "regret that they
contracted so early." 292
Focusing on a paradigmatic example in which the sunk costs do not
affect the nature and terms of the ultimate bargain neglects much of
precontractual bargaining in which information is transmitted incrementally and incremental information is utilized to shape the deals. I
therefore see the paradigmatic case differently than Professors Craswell
or Katz. Because every promisor faces uncertainty about the future, she
cares enormously about various actions (especially screening29 3 and signaling29 4) of the promisee as a means for gaining information and reducing uncertainty. Rather than taking any "irreversible actions" now, 295 she
may prefer to solicit information now and "hedge" 296 her bets by retaining flexibility. Promisors can encourage the transmission of information
by soliciting sunk signaling costs from the promisee. These actions are
typically requested by the promisor because they lower the uncertainty
associated with contracting by providing valuable information about the
297
promisee through a screening process or trial run.
Neglect of these information transmission issues seems to be relatively widespread, even amongst articles focusing on the "Economics of
Promissory Estoppel. ' ' 298 Professor Katz, for example, often focuses on
reliance in the post-offer situation and thus ignores the incentive effect
between reliance and sunk costs and the formation of the offer which
should inform any debate about the desired legal effect of interim reli290. See id. at 1267-68.
291. Id. at 1268.
292. Id.
293. For a discussion of "screening" techniques in the context of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex.
341 (1854), which include "offering a menu of insurance contracts" by which millers with different
damages can self-select the policy "that is optimal for their expected damages," see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33, at 103.
294. For a discussion of signaling, see generally A. MIcHAEL SPENCE, MARKEr SIGNAUNG: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND Rm.A--

ScaENmO PROCESSES (1974).

295. See HIsHS.Emt & REy, supra note 78, at 205; see also Katz, supra note 1, at 1270-71
(discussing value of the "hedge").
296. Hmstn.ya
& RIEY, supra note 78, at 205.
297. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Outline for AALS Contracts Workshop 55 (June, 1989);
see also cases cited supra note 84.
298. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 1, at 1249.
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ance. In examining post-offer reliance, Katz has ignored the fact that
early reliance may be beneficial to the other party. Analysis such as Professor Katz's, which focuses on the incentives and reliance calculations
of the offeree in the post-offer situation without simultaneously examining the question of how the offeror and offeree should be encouraged
with legal rules to invest sunk costs that are of immediate value to the
other party, is misguided.
The informational exchange problem is currently neglected in the
literature analyzing promissory estoppe 29 9 because of an inaccurate paradigm example. Informational exchange must inform the debate surrounding what effect reliance should have on such issues as the revocability of
an offer and the compensability of interim reliance. The analysis must
start earlier in the process and examine preliminary negotiations before
the offer is made. Explanations that focus on the incentives and reliance
calculations of the offeree in the post offer situation3°° without simultaneously examining the question of how the offeror and the offeree should
be encouraged with legal rules to take sunk cost steps that are valuable
to the other party (and that they might not take without a legal rule or
some form of negotiated private payment) ignore the incentive effect between reliance and sunk costs and the formulation of the ultimate offer.
Incentives that will facilitate the investment of sunk costs must be devised. Those incentives might take the form of privately negotiated payments or law-supplied liability rules. Current analysis cannot ignore the
interconnection between sunk costs and the formulation of an offer and
must therefore focus on reliance investment which can help the offerors
to formulate fully contingent offers.
3. The Information Neglect Problem: Impediments to a Generalized
Model for Reliance Analysis
Neglect of the information problem prevents Craswell and others
from devising a complete model of precontractual bargaining which can
provide the basis for positing a generalized model of the potential obstacles to devising contractual arrangements. By introducing a model of incremental bargaining in which each promisor needs to solicit information
to reduce levels of uncertainty, each promisee remains subject to promisor exploitation of sunk costs, and each party stands to benefit from a
299. But see generally Kostritsky, supra note 2 (seeking to develop rules to facilitate the
transmission of such information during precontractual negotiations).
300. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 62-66 and 233-64 (discussing the views of Avery Katz).
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flattening out of the cost curves from early investment of reliance, 01 and
it becomes possible to "project average behavior with and without intervention" 302 and to posit a law-supplied default rule that will be preferred
by most bargainers. 30 3 That rule might even compensate for precontractual expenses where "the probability of consummating the deal may be
too low for reliance to be efficient ....
V.

THE INFORMATION PROBLEM: REDEFINING THE CONTENT OF A

LAW-

SUPPLIED DEFAULT RULE

Focusing on these neglected aspects of uncertainty would recontextualize the rules governing precontractual liability and thus promote solutions which can encourage the transmission of information from promisee
to promisor early during precontractual negotiations, thereby reducing
promisor uncertainty. Craswell and others have proposed approaches
which require the promisor to price the ultimate transaction, yet they
seem indifferent to the means of facilitating the transmission of information through reliance actions of the promisee in early precontractual negotiations necessary to price the ultimate transaction. 0 5
The neglect of informational issues and the uncertainty problem is
reflected in Professor Craswell's conceptual scheme for understanding
why parties might choose to commit before an actual contractual ex30 7
change takes place 6 and to understand why a person would commit.
Craswell explains why Seller (promisor) would commit in advance
to prevent the Buyer (promisee) from investing an inefficiently low
amount in reliance. Yet, by formulating a rule justification in terms of
generally promoting beneficial or productive reliance and benefits to the
promisor in terms of higher prices on the ultimate transaction, and by abstracting the formulation of the rule from the particular context of
precontractual, informational bargaining uncertainties, one cannot fully
understand what the content of the default rule should be nor how the
nature of the law-supplied implied commitment might have to be specifically crafted to meet such informational uncertainties.
301. See Interview with BJ. Martino, July, 1993.
302. Coffey, supra note 12, at 4.
303. He must, however, devise a liability rule "so that the amount of liability does not exceed
its value." Interview with BJ. Martino, supra note 301.
304. Craswell, supra note 1, at 499.
305. See supra part IV.G.
306. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 488 ("discuss[ing] two reasons why an advance commitment might be attractive to the parties on balance").
307. See id. at 483-84.
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A party might willingly make certain advance commitments to generate the other party's reliance, yet the scope of that commitment would
necessarily be different from a commitment that could be made later on
when more details of the ultimate transaction could be known, agreed on
and priced. Thus, it is impossible to focus on the justification for a lawsupplied rule or to focus on the rejection of any law-supplied obligation
without also addressing the nature and content of potential law-supplied
implied commitments. One cannot begin to grasp "why an advance commitment might be attractive to the parties on balance" 30 8 without understanding that such reasons may be intimately connected to the incremental nature of the bargaining process and that the nature of the
commitment might differ depending on its timing.
Because prior scholarship focuses mainly on the planning benefits to
the promisee from the security derived from an advance commitment 3°9
and the increased ability of the promisor to charge more for such ultimate commitment, 310 the conceptual scheme for understanding the dynamics of precontractual commitment is too narrow to provide a foundation on which to build the content of an implied commitment which is
sensitive to the informational exchanges of precontractual bargaining. Because Craswell discounts the information problems inherent in precontractual bargaining 31' (which could be mitigated by promisee investments), he apparently sees the average promisor as primarily interested in
the ultimate price she can charge on the ultimate transaction. Assuming
that the price must be settled with the commitment, 3 2 he ignores informational requirements that Seller might have ex ante to price that transaction. Under this assumption, the Seller can and would prefer to commit
to a price on the basis of the limited information which she has available
now rather than making a limited interim generalized commitment to
308. Id. at 488.
309. See id. at 492 (discussing the need for "an advance commitment ... when one party
must perform before the other. When performance is sequential, the party who performs first takes a
huge risk if he or she does so without some assurance that the other party will provide the agreed-on
return performance."); see also Goetz & Scott supra note 12, at 1266-67 (discussing "adaptive
gain" which includes the "higher temporal level of satisfaction" achievable "than if the wealth were
transferred without any advance notice," which gain "may appropriately be termed 'beneficial reliance' "). By expanding the focus beyond the "production of beneficial reliance" to include the reduction of promisor uncertainty, it becomes possible to reconceptualize the "principal social rationale
of promising." Id. at 1269.
310. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 495.
311. He discounts them by rationalizing a law-supplied default rule without focusing on impediments to private alternatives. See generally Craswell, supra note 1.

312. See supra part IV.C.
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generate reliance needed to reduce uncertainty on the terms of the ultimate transaction.3 13 If Craswell does not contemplate ex ante pricing but
instead a bifurcated scheme with initial commitments to be followed by
later pricing, 314 he fails to focus on informational exchange issues. He
therefore cannot explain why the scheme should be bifurcated and how
and why a commitment of generalized obligation would serve the incremental bargaining needs of the parties. 315 Yet, in suggesting that a legal
commitment priced "to compensate for her losses in those cases where
she withdraws from the deal and must pay damages, ' 31 6 Craswell ignores
the possibility that, other liability rules of implied commitment with a different content could be adopted. Such rules could provide an appropriate
incentive for promisee investment while at the same time offering the
promisor a means of generating promisee reliance without requiring the
promisor to commit to or to price the ultimate transaction ex ante. The
law could supply an implied generalized commitment which would encourage promisees' investment without requiring the promisor to price a
transaction before that information is available. It would also relieve the
promisor of trying to extract a premium from promisees whose deals materialize to cover failed deals when such promisees might, in fact, prefer
not to pay for non-related failures.
VL

COMPARING ALTERNATIVES: SELECTING THE OPTIMAL RULE GIVEN

BARGAINING CONSTRAINTS AND THE INFORMATIONAL UNCERTAINTY
PROBLEM

The failure to grapple with bargaining constraints and informational
uncertainty problems engenders another defect-methodological in nature-in the economic analyses of promissory estoppel reliance issues. It
prompts authors to suggest solutions to the precontractual reliance problem without (1) positing the suggested approach as an optimal solution
given the bargaining constraints including informational uncertainty, or
(2) examining private and law-supplied alternatives to determine which
solution would be the cheapest alternative for achieving efficient reliance,
given the bargaining process constraints. Recent scholars of precontractual reliance have failed to compare private alternatives or law-supplied
313. For a discussion of such an interim generalized commitment, see Kostritsky, supra note
2, at 630-31, 672-73.
314. See supra part IV.C.
315. See generally Craswell, supra note 1,at 492 (discussing "the Hobbesian argument by
showing that enforceable commitments may also be useful in protecting... reliance").
316. Id.at 496.
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default rules which might be used to achieve efficient, optimal reliance.31 7
Instead, they suggest particular liability rules to facilitate efficient reliance 318 or reject law-supplied obligations, 319 but do so in a contextual
vacuum. The suggested rules are predicated on an assumed paradigmatic
case in which barriers to bargaining do not exist-an unrealistic assumption. These analyses seem to suggest a liability rule predicated on determining the efficiency of the reliance at a particular moment. There is little recognition that uncertainty problems may require promisees to invest
early even when efficiency analysis of a particular moment might technically suggest inefficiency.
No scholar should suggest a particular rule as optimal without a full
comparison of possible alternative solutions to the problems of precontractual bargaining. Without an examination of the costs of private strategies for promoting efficient reliance, including side payments, and the
costs for parties of a liability rule which requires the promisor to calculate a price large enough to justify making an enforceable commitment as
well as the costs of other law-supplied rules, it is hard to provide a justificative rationale for a particular law-supplied rule. What is the reason
for choosing the suggested rule over other private alternatives or lawsupplied terms or rules? If a liability rule is suggested because it will
presumably enhance the efficiency of the reliance and be the least costly
measure, then what is the rationale for the law imposing a liability default rule? It should not be adopted merely because the parties would
prefer it, but because certain obstacles prevent the parties' adoption of
the rule themselves, and because the parties would prefer it as the cheapest alternative means of achieving optimal reliance given those
320
obstacles.
The failure to assess fully the costs and benefits of parties' private
strategies as well as law-supplied alternatives for overcoming such impediments can be explained in part by the analytical frameworks currently in use which neglect bargaining impediments. Analyses neglecting
such impediments will also necessarily fail to compare the benefits and
costs of various approaches to determine whether they are the optimal
317. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, supra note 38; Shell, supra note 27; see also Kostritsky,
supra note 2, at 647-50 (discussing absence of comparison in Shell and Farber and Matheson's work
to private incentive schemes or other law default rules).
318. See, e.g., Wils, supra note 1, at 106 (suggesting liability in cases of misrepresentation).
319. See, e.g., id. at 103 (rejecting law-supplied rule "which obliges parties in precontractual
negotiations to contribute to each other's reliance costs").
320. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 673-75; see also E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey to Juliet
P. Kostritsky, supra note 101.
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mechanism for overcoming the barriers to fully specified bargained-for
3 22
32
contracts to protect interim reliance. ' Craswell's, Wils', and Katz's
analyses fail to examine fully the costs of private alternative strategies
for promoting efficient reliance. Without an examination of such costs, it
becomes problematic to justify a particular law-supplied rule. Would the
parties have chosen a particular law-supplied rule? Is it cheaper than the
alternatives?
Professor Craswell's approach illustrates the difficulty of evaluating
solutions which exist separate and apart from the particular contextual
problems of incremental precontractual bargaining. He suggests two proposals for precontractual 323 liability, one of which would adopt a default
rule imposing liability for efficient reliance. 324 The contrary "bright line"
rules 325 might impose a penalty default 326 to insure that parties explicitly
adopted their own terms. The difficulty with suggesting these approaches
for promoting efficient solutions is that it seems to suggest that courts
can define appropriate solutions to the problem of precontractual reliance
without a detailed analysis of why these particular strategies should be
singled out. How can strategies for optimal reliance be identified without
an appreciation of contracting barriers which the strategies can overcome? A recognition of bargaining process impediments would prompt a
more complete treatment comparing private strategies as well as other
law-supplied rules to determine which alternative would be optimal,
given the constraints.
In his article, Craswell suggests a default rule as a means of achieving efficiency.327 Under the rule, he contemplates an adjustment of price
321. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 648 (suggesting that recent analyses of promissory estoppel cannot determine if a rule would be preferred by most bargainers because they do not compare
the costs of a particular rule with costs of other approaches including private mechanisms).
322. I have not detailed Professor Katz's failure to examine possible alternative strategies to
the problem of suboptimal investment under circumstances of bargaining constraints. Instead he suggests a rule that places the cost of reliance on the least-cost avoider with bargaining power. However
appealing that solution may seem, particularly when it results in allocating Hoffman's losses to the
Red Owl franchisor, see Katz, supra note 1, at 1300, it still fails to explain why a law-supplied rule
is superior to any private strategies for achieving efficient reliance.
323. Craswell's default rule can be applied to other formation issues as well. The unifying element is "that courts are entitled to consider the efficiency of B[uyer]'s reliance as one factor that is
relevant in applying the various contract formation doctrines." Craswell, supra note 1, at 507.
324. See id.
325. Id. at 545.
326. Craswell finds the term penalty default, borrowed from Ayres and Gertner, as somewhat
misleading because "default rules designed to encourage parties to make their agreements more explicit are not necessarily slanted against either party." Id.

327. See id. at 507.
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on the proposed transaction with a liability rule.328 Is this rule the only or
best mechanism for promoting efficient reliance? If efficient reliance is
the goal and it is in both parties' interests to have efficient reliance, 329 is
the Craswell liability default rule the one that parties would prefer over
other options such as no liability and/or negotiated side payments for interim acts of reliance or an alternative, more flexible liability rule in
view of realistic assumptions about behavioral realities? Without a detailed examination of alternative legal rules, the parties' reactions to and
the costs of such rules, as well as the costs of private adaptations, it is
difficult to suggest that a particular rule will advance reliance in the most
cost efficient way; the suggested rules will then remain only as possible,
but not necessarily optimal, solutions to promoting efficient reliance.
Before determining that a particular rule is optimal, not only must
Craswell and others examine alternative legal rules and private mechanisms, but they must do so as a means of resolving particular problems
which the parties face in precontractual bargaining. 330 When Craswell
suggests a liability rule to which parties will respond with a price adjustment as the proposed means of achieving efficient reliance, 331 it is not
clear that the suggested rule is responsive to the particular problems of
precontractual bargaining. If uncertainty and the moral hazard problem of
opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs converge as major problems
plaguing the parties in precontractual bargaining, 332 are the approaches
suggested by Craswell, Wils, and Katz the preferred methods of solving
those problems at the least cost and thereby promoting optimal reliance?
Resolving how and why the law should intervene with a law-supplied default rule requires a model of the realities of the bargaining process, including the uncertainty problem, which disables promisors from initially
specifying obligations that are fully specified as to price, etc.
Craswell's approach of a liability rule, coupled with a price adjustment by promisors, may not be the only or best alternative, given the
constraints of the bargaining process. His default rule seems to imply that
parties will opt for making a commitment, thus hoping to make "the best
328. See id. at 495. This pricing could take place either ex ante or ex post depending on how
Craswell's article is interpreted. See supra part IV.C.
329. See generally supra part IV.D.
330. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 641-46 (detailing problems of precontractual bargaining,
including information asymmetries, bounded rationality, and opportunism); see also WILLIAmSON,
supra note 21, at 45-47.
331. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 495-96.
332. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 651.
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choice among the 'irreversible' actions in the first place. 333 Although a
liability rule might overcome the moral hazard problem of the opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs by protecting promisees' investments,
Craswell's rule does not address or resolve the uncertainty problem because his solution seems, under one interpretation,33 4 to require the promisor to price the ultimate transaction ex ante. The commitment for the
promisor must be responsive to the uncertainty problem and, therefore,
should permit a "hedge" rather than "immediate . . . action" 335 or a
commitment in ignorance made in the hope that the price ultimately
charged on deals that actually materialize will adequately compensate for
deals that fail. It should permit the promisor to "retain flexibility"3 3 6 and
to acquire more information before making a commitment to the ultimate
transaction with a price. Craswell seems to assume that the Sellers of the
world will opt to commit on the basis of limited information, choosing to
compensate for the risk of "irreversible actions" 33 7 made in a state of uncertainty by charging more money to make up for the fraction of the
deals that do not materialize. 33 8 Certainly one option that the promisor
may prefer over committing with a negotiated price would be to acquire
further information as a way of reducing that uncertainty. In those cases,
a Seller would actively solicit certain actions as a way of reducing uncertainty before committing to a transaction with a price. Even if Craswell
recognizes that need to hedge and intends to permit ex post price adjustment, then Craswell must explain what the content of the early enforceable commitment might look like and why it should assume a particular
content. Perhaps the content of the default liability rule should be geared
to enhancing flexibility during the precontractual period. The rule might
facilitate the security of investment without the negative effects of a liability rule requiring promisors to price inherently uncertain risks.
The failure to situate a suggested liability or default rule within the
context of precontractual bargaining problems means that the rules suggested may well fail to respond to the particular problems of the precontractual period. Only by addressing those problems directly could it be
determined whether a suggested solution will actually solve those
problems more efficiently than alternative solutions.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

See HIRSm.anIFa & RILEY, supra note 78, at 205.
See generally supra part IV.C.
HIRSHLEH;E & R-aEy, supra note 78, at 204.
Id. at 205.
Id.
See Craswell, supra note 1, at 495-96.
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CASTING THE NET OF LIABILrrY Too BROADLY OR Too NARROWLY

A failure to address the constraints of bargaining and to situate a liability rule within the constraints of incremental bargaining, and a neglect of the value of the precontractual information problem, prompts analysts (mistakenly) to draw the liability lines too narrowly. Focusing on
such barriers would improve the results by making it easier to devise
rules which would permit appropriate linedrawing on the compensability
of interim reliance.
A neglect of the barriers problem and the valuable role of interim
reliance in reducing uncertainty also prompts authors to draw the lines of
liability too narrowly. Approaches neglecting the uncertainty problems
faced by promisors or ignoring the value of interim reliance in reducing
such promisor uncertainty, ignoring the interactive effect between reliance and reduced uncertainty, or focusing on calculations which are
made in isolation (by either promisee or promisor) lead scholars to devalue the importance of precontractual reliance in the reduction of uncertainty and to remain overly skeptical of the value of early reliance. This
skepticism prompts authors to unduly restrict the scope of liability in
early precontractual negotiations. By denying liability for early precontractual reliance when the transaction probability is remote, the authors'
solutions fail to recognize or to solve the information problem in which
promisors may need information early on to reduce uncertainty.
Professor Katz also circumscribes liability rules too narrowly. He
finds that if "the contractor has all the bargaining power,1 339 then it is
inappropriate to impose liability on the subcontractor-offeror for the reliance expenses of the general contractor, explaining that "[t]he contractor
does not need any legal protection to be induced to rely optimally; his
bargaining power provides adequate protection. ' 340 Katz's ruling out of a
liability rule in these circumstances illustrates how the failure to take account of incremental bargaining can prompt analysts to draw the liability
lines too narrowly.
Katz's argument for denying liability for offeree expenses where the
offeree retains the bargaining power proceeds as follows:
If...
the contractor has all the bargaining power, no subcontractor will want to
commit to a binding option before the last week. This is because, in order to break

even on such an option, she must charge enough of a profit to cover the reliance

339.
340.

Katz, supra note 1, at 1275.
Id. at 1276.
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damages she must pay if she is unable to perform.

34

Essentially, making the subcontractor liable for reliance costs will cause
subcontractor offerors to delay making offers as a means of "control[ling] these reliance costs. '3342 "[H]er incentive will be to wait too
34
long before making an offer.
Professor Katz's reluctance to make prebargain reliance the foundation for an irrevocable offer and his predicted negative behavioral effects
from making the subcontractor's offer irrevocable upon the general contractor's reliance 344 seems to stem from his perception of the bargaining
process as one that does not proceed incrementally. He has assumed that
the effect of making the offeror liable will be to cause the offeror to delay because, otherwise, the offeree's bargaining power will permit him to
"keep the entire surplus, ' 345 making "an early option . . .a sure loser
' '3
for the subcontractor. 46
This predicted behavioral effect ignores certain aspects of the bargaining context which might dictate a different approach. First, the offeror-subcontractor has an interest in the offeree-general contractor taking
certain initial steps of reliance to secure the overall contract. Delay of the
offer in that context might cause the offeree to fail to take those initial
steps to secure the contract. More broadly, the offeror-subcontractor has
an interest in securing those initial steps. Rather than assuming the law
must abide by the current regime of an irrevocable, fully contingent offer, the law could seek to devise a generalized performance obligation
which would govern initial negotiations to elicit early promisee reliance
necessary to reduce promisor uncertainty. That generalized performance
obligation would arguably be preferable to binding the offeror subcontractor to a fully contingent offer early on.
Presumably, binding the subcontractor to a generalized performance
obligation would serve both parties' interests. The performance obligation
would curtail "wealth costs" which would be "substantially less than an
unconditional commitment to sell his goods or services on specified
terms" 347 and thus would not cause the subcontractor to delay in furnishing any commitment. Moreover, the performance obligation would fur341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id.
Id. at 1273.
Id
See id. at 1276.
Id.
Id.
Interview with Ronald J. Coffey, supra note 80.
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nish the offeree with the security needed to induce the initial steps of reliance needed to furnish the unconditional commitment.
Instead of assuming a fixed offer, and considering the wisdom of
making the offer irrevocable upon reliance, it would be better to focus on
the bargaining process as a series of interactive steps during which the
offeror seeks to elicit certain acts of reliance as a way of resolving uncertainties that exist and the promisee must decide whether to invest in
each of those acts of reliance. In order to secure the sunk costs of each
party that are valuable to the other party, it might be important to impose
a liability rule, given the difficulties of achieving a private arrangement
to protect such investments.
Neglect of the uncertainty problems inherent in incremental bargaining leads Professor Craswell to devalue the importance of early reliance
in reducing precontractual uncertainty and to remain skeptical about the
value of early reliance on indefinite proposals. 314 In discussing reliance
during preliminary negotiations where many issues are left open, Craswell thinks there should be fewer cases at this stage where liability is
needed to encourage efficient reliance. 49 Craswell is therefore reluctant
30
to impose liability in the early stages of precontractual bargaining.
The reluctance to admit the value of interim reliance in reducing
precontractual uncertainty for promisors makes many scholars skeptical
about the wisdom of early reliance liability. Focusing on the value of interim reliance in reducing uncertainty and in enhancing flexibility for the
promisor suggests that there are in fact positive and compelling reasons
for imposing early precontractual liability.
VIII.

EXAGGERATED CONCERN WITH THE

MORAL

HAZARD PROBLEM

A failure to recognize the importance of informational uncertainty
issues distorts and exaggerates the danger of overreliance under an enforceability rule. Craswell explains this risk as follows: "If S[eller] is liable for B[uyer]'s expectation damages," ' 351 "[such] expectation damages
allow B[uyer] to capture all of the upside potential of his reliance without making him bear any of the downside potential. This gives B[uyer]
an incentive to rely too heavily, relative to the efficient level of
352
reliance.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

See Craswell, supra note 1, at 499.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 494.
Id.; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 12, at 1279. ("[11f a promise is legally enforcea-
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The moral hazard problem described above is potentially a real one
for a liability rule. However, the moral hazard problem may be less serious than perceived for several reasons. First, the possibility of judicial error may act as a check on Buyer's incentive to overrely. Because the
Buyer may not be certain that a court will compensate for all reliance,
the Buyer may hesitate to overrely to the extent predicted by Craswell.
Second, if the reliance compensation does not account for lost opportunities, Buyer's incentive to overrely may be diminished. The Buyer will
hesitate to rely and give up other valuable opportunities if reliance compensation caps her recovery.
Finally, the moral hazard problem objection to liability rules may
have been exaggerated in the existing literature because of the focus on
enforceability of promises related to the ultimate transaction. To the extent that the liability rule is geared not to the ultimate promise but to
making the promisee liable for steps taken that are valuable to the promisor because of their value in resolving uncertainties, objections to a liability rule based on overreliance become less persuasive and ultimately
less troublesome. The promisor is being made to answer for reliance
steps that have been signaled by the promisor to be important. Even if
Buyer is not "bear[ing] any of the downside potential, ' 353 she should
still be compensated for reliance because it has immediate value to the
promisor.

IX.

EFFICIENT RELIANCE CALCULATIONS 354 AND A SOLUTION FOR THE
ExTERNALrrY PROBLEM

Many of the analytical flaws in current instrumental approaches to
precontractual liability issues derive from the traditional models for judging the efficiency of reliance. Because those models seem to assume that
the promisee can make a reliance calculation in isolation, weighing the
benefit and cost to themselves of any reliance investment, they neglect to
advert to a calculus for judging the efficiency of reliance which takes account of the value of the promisee's investment in reducing the promisor's uncertainties. The value of the investment is conceived too nar55
rowly in terms of increasing profit on the transaction.3
ble, and the regret costs shift to the promisor, the promisee may engage in a greater than optimal
level of reliance.").
353. Craswell, supra note 1, at 494.
354. See id. at 490-91.
355. See, e.g., Katz, supra note I, at 1267 (discussing "the cooperative surplus").

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:325

Efficient reliance decisions require the promisee (acting party) to
compare the initial cost of the investment with the value of the investment, including calculation of when the "expected net profits . . . equal
to the difference between discounted profits and discounted lost reliance, ' 356 is greatest. That calculation requires the promisee to balance the
costs and benefits of investing early against the costs and benefits of
357
waiting.
Early investment in reliance on a deal may produce "a more productive" investment 3 8 but will be risky because the uncertainty level is
high at the beginning. Waiting will resolve much uncertainty but it will
entail other costs, such as higher negotiation costs and foregone opportunities. 359 Investment decisions require a tradeoff of these costs and benefits. The efficiency of the reliance investment requires that:
the advantages of beneficial reliance and the disadvantages of detrimental reliance
be balanced against each other at the margin. Deciding to enter into a contract too
early, when the level of uncertainty is high and the productive value of reliance
low, results in too much reliance. It leads to sinking costs at a time when they are
likely to be wasted. Contracting too late, on the other hand, forgoes the benefits of
36
early planning and preparation. 0

Ideally, ex ante the acting party making the reliance investment
should be able to calculate how the investment of a particular reliance
action will affect the probability of a deal being reached or the possibility of a breach in the post-contractual phase and thus should be able to
compare the costs and benefits of taking the action and reach the efficient result. In an ideal world the promisee should be able to make that
calculation and arrive at an efficient result by internalizing costs and benefits even though the calculation is difficult because the promisee is making decisions in an uncertain world. Regardless of whether the reliance
takes the form of sunk signaling costs or "anticipatory performance, ' 36'
the promisee weighs the benefits of waiting (to resolve uncertainty)
against the costs of waiting. 362 A promisee will engage in the reliance if
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id. at 1270.

See id. at 1268.
Id. at 1267.
See id.

360. Id. at 1268.
361. See Wils, supra note 1, at 110 (discussing reliance taking this form of anticipatory
performance).
362. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1268. Notice that the uncertainties in the model utilized by
Katz relate solely to the uncertainty as to whether the offeror will be able to perform based on "successful completion ... at another job site." Id. These uncertainties do not relate to the offeree and
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it is efficient and withhold the reliance if the investment is inefficient in
the sense that the costs outweighs the benefits.
Craswell's model of reliance calculation for determining efficient reliance typifies efficiency analysis for reliance. It requires a court to assess "(1) the potential upside from the reliance . . . (2) the potential
downside from the reliance . . . and (3) the probability of each of these
two outcomes. 3 63 That model of efficient reliance calculation typifies
law and economics approaches to efficient reliance. The Goetz and Scott
reliance calculation similarly requires that the promisee weigh the cost of
the reliance and the "probabilities of performance and nonperformance"
to determine if an investment is cost efficient.364 A promisee making an
investment decision of whether to invest in specialized machinery, for
example, must weigh profits from the investment cost and the probability
of the deal materializing.
The reliance calculation adverted to by Professors Craswell, Goetz,
Scott, and Katz is one in which the calculation is made in isolation. The
individual investor of the sunk costs weighs the costs and benefits of that
investment and makes decisions based on self-interested wealth maximizing. 365 What is missing is a provision in the calculus for acts of investment which will be valuable to the promisor by providing information to
reduce uncertainty as to the ultimate transaction. 366 The acts of investment that Buyer must make are evaluated solely in terms of how much
they "increaseU the expected value of the transaction. '367 Professor Katz
similarly ignores the interactive effect and makes essentially the same
point when he talks about a "more productive" investment 368 made earlier on. Under his analysis, one looks at increase in the value of the
overall contract and profits rather than interim value to promisor.
What is, of course, not included in these individualistic approaches
for calculating the efficiency of reliance is a provision for maximizing
they do not seem to affect the ultimate terms of the transaction. In other instances where the uncertainties relate to the quality issues of the offeree, for example, the uncertainties will not resolve at a
"constant rate." Id. Moreover, resolution of those uncertainties will affect the nature of the ultimate
transaction, and thus resolution of the uncertainties may have potential value to the offeror in a way
that resolution about the offeror's own availability would not.
363. Craswell, supra note 1, at 491; see also POLINSKY, supra note 15, at 32-33.
364. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 12, at 1270 n.26.
365. See POUNSKY, supra note 15, at 25.
366. See generally Bengt R. Holstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in I HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTAL ORGANIATION (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Villig eds., 1989) (discussing
problem of incomplete information, incomplete contracts, and organizational changes in the firm).
367. Craswell, supra note 1, at 495.
368. Katz, supra note 1, at 1267.
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the interests of both parties and increasing overall wealth maximization.369 That wealth maximization would presumably include informational value to the promisor from interim reliance. The reliance calculations for efficiency are deficient because they do not account for the
potential value to the promisor of the promisee's actions. That benefit is
external to the promisee's calculations, and because such actions may not
directly increase Buyer's profits, there may be a tendency for promisees
to underrely and underinvest.
The externality problem explains why ordinary, efficient reliance
calculations may fail to promote optimal reliance. The promisee on his
own does not consider the benefits to the promisor from taking the reliance steps and thus those benefits are not internalized by the promisee.
The opposite externality problem exists for the promisor who, when calculating the costs and benefits of promising, will not consider the harmful external effects on the promisee. To solve the externality problem of
the promisor not considering harmful effects on the promisee, and to prevent the underreliance problem, the law can impose liability on the promisor. The downside of promisor liability is the problem of promisee overreliance. 370 To solve the problem of the promisee overrelying, the law can
leave all responsibility for detrimental reliance on the promisee where the
promisee would internalize the costs and benefits of reliance. This rule
might cause underreliance.
To avoid the problems with these approaches the law should expand
the range of approaches and tailor those approaches to the incremental
bargaining process. An approach that attempts to choose between full enforcement or no enforcement based on the likelihood of the transaction 371
cannot solve the ever present informational uncertainty in precontractual
bargaining. It will always assume that early precontractual reliance will
be inefficient where the probabilities of the transaction are remote. Yet,
in that context, promisors need investment by promisees even where the
strict calculation might suggest overreliance is the major problem. This
information problem could be alleviated by postulating a liability rule for
interim reliance which could overcome the disinvestment incentive while
at the same time preventing the moral hazard problem. The promisor
could be liable for interim reliance that had been requested by the prom369. See Wils, supra note 1, at 98 (detailing externality problem as follows: "The acting
party, however, only takes into account the part of the increased surplus which she expects to
receive.").
370. This is the "moral hazard" problem. See supra note 27.
371. See Craswell, supra note 1, at 499.
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isor and that was valuable to the promisor in reducing uncertainty, but
the liability rule would be an alternative commitment not geared to the
372
ultimate transaction.
X.

IMPROVING DOCTRNAL APPLICATIONS

The failure to confront incremental bargaining problems, particularly
the uncertainty problem, makes the scholars of precontractual liability unable to offer creative solutions to particular doctrinal problems. The subcontractor context offers a particular context for exploring the problem of
informational uncertainties which plague precontractual bargaining. Recognition of the uncertainty problem and tailoring an approach to that uncertainty could provide the basis for a rule that provides an incentive for
promisees to invest without binding offerors to the terms of an ultimate
transaction before that is realistically possible.
In critiquing the Drennan rule and postulating that subjecting the of373
feror to liability for reliance losses will prompt a delay in the offer,
Katz assumes that the law will be manipulating the point at which an offer is made without contemplating the possibility of some lesser alternative, flexible commitment that stops short of an offer. It may be that Professor Katz is correct in concluding that making offers irrevocable at
inception will cause offerors to hesitate before making offers in the future. 374 By focusing on the problems of uncertainty that the parties face,
it may then be possible to devise a better rule for the subcontracting context-one that relieves the subcontractor of the costs of the inflexibility of
the Drennan rule. The Drennan rule binds the subcontractor as soon as
the general contractor relies on the bid. 375 The difficulty with binding the
subcontractor to his offer at inception is that the general contractor, because of the barrier of the unforeseeability of the future on whether he
will get the overall job, cannot offer an unconditional promise to
purchase the goods or services that the subcontractor has offered. Thus,
any consideration that the general contractor might furnish in exchange
for the subcontractor's commitment would be less than the subcontractor
was willing to take in exchange for her own unconditional commitment.37 6 Recognition of the problem of the unforeseeability of the future
that the contractor faces and of the difficulty in binding the subcontractor
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

See
See
See
See
See

Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 672.
Katz, supra note 1, at 1273.
id. at 1265.
FARNswoRTH, supra note 96, § 3.25, at 302.
Interview with Ronald J. Coffey, supra note 80.
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when the general contractor cannot offer something of equivalent value
suggests that binding the subcontractor at inception would be less than
ideal. Instead, the law could seek to supply a liability rule which would
provide an incentive for each party to furnish the sunk costs necessary to
get a deal started without overprotecting the general contractor and without devising a rule which causes the subcontractor to delay making
377
offers.
One problem with critiquing Drennan, and suggesting that subcontractors' bids should not be made irrevocable, 378 is that it ignores the possibility that if you do not provide liability against sunk costs that a party
may incur and not be able to salvage, that party may not take the first
steps to invest the sunk costs and thus the party will not rely optimally
unless the offeror is somehow bound or made responsible for the sunk
costs of the other party. Even though theoretically the putative offeree
can calculate, for example, whether the investment of the sunk cost is
worth it-by comparing the cost to the possible profits on the deal discounted by the possibility that the deal will not go through and taking
into account ex ante how much the investment of the reliance will affect
the possibility of the deal going through-the offeree will not consider the
external benefits to the offeror. In the subcontracting example, for the
general contractor to invest sunk costs in relying on the subcontractor's
offer and positioning itself to be in a position to make an offer to the
subcontractor, the general contractor should be compensated in some
way. However, because of the externality problem mentioned earlier, he
may not invest those sunk costs and the subcontractor's chances of securing the deal with the general contractor will be reduced. To solve these
problems, an interim liability rule should be adopted.
XI.

Too

MUCH CONCERN WITH THE BAD FAITH COMPONENT OF
PROMISING: CONCEPTUAL MIISFOCUS

The neglect of the uncertainty problem and the information transmission problem leads to a conceptual misfocus: it prompts scholars to
focus undue attention on the bad faith aspects of promissory liability.
Bad faith concerns figure prominently in the instrumental scholarship on
precontractual reliance, including that of Gergen, 379 Wils,380 and Goetz
377. See id
378. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 1, at 1276-77.
379. See Mark P. Gergen, Liability for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S. CAL. L REv. 1
(1990) (advocating creation of contractual remedy for precontractual misrepresentations).
380. Wils, supra note 1.
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and Scott.381 Many of these authors, assume that one party with superior
information will strategically misrepresent the likelihood of a deal materializing in order to induce reliance which would actually be inefficient in
the circumstances. Thus, Goetz and Scott want to make the promisor liable where there is a "bad bet promise," but not otherwise. 382 They argue
that liability should not obtain where there is a "good bet" promise because "from the ex ante standpoint, a promisee would not wish to discourage a promise that creates a prospect of gain outweighing the risk of
'
uncompensated loss. 383
It seems that Goetz and Scott are assuming that the state of the
world is more certain than it is in fact. Goetz and Scott assume that you
can, from the "ex ante standpoint," identify scenarios as "good bets"
and "bad bets" 38 4 whereas, in truth, it is hard to divide the world into
good and bad bets ex ante. Rather, the world is in a state of uncertainty
regarding the probability of these deals occurring.
If the world could be so easily divided into "good bet" and "bad
bet" deals, then it might make sense to impose a liability rule to protect
promisees from overreliance and to discourage promisors from making
promises regarding "bad bets." However, when the uncertainty as to the
state of potential promises reigns, then the basis for making promisors liable for promises can be expanded. Even with investments that are a
"good bet" for the promisee, there should be a possibility of compensation because of the value to the promisor. Under this scheme the basis of
promisor liability would be different. The promisees would be offered
compensation even where there is a "good bet" for two reasons. First, to
the extent that the reliance results in a tangible benefit to the promisor of
reducing uncertainty, it should be compensated. Second, because there is
an opportunity to hold the promisee up once the investments are made,
there may still be a disincentive to invest even if net beneficial reliance
is positive and the deal otherwise looks like a good deal. To overcome
that disincentive, the promisor should be liable.
The misrepresentation concern of these other authors demonstrates
how a failure to perceive the uncertainty issue can lead to overly restrictive approaches to liability. Instead of needing only to provide a penalty
formula to deter promisors from making promises that are "bad bets" for
the promisee, the law should expand liability to include liability for other
381. Goetz & Scott, supra note 12.
382. 1& at 1283.
383.

Id.

384. Id.
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promises where such liability might be needed to overcome a disincentive to invest and would be valuable to promisors.
XI.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of promissory estoppel represents an important exception to the bargain requirement. Although protection for the reliance principle-embodied by promissory estoppel doctrine-has grown, the courts
and commentators have offered different rationales to justify reliance protection and to determine its appropriate scope, including: fairness concerns, 8 5 tort theories, and economic efficiency. This article has focused
on recent scholarship that has used economic efficiency to determine
precontractual reliance liability issues. While these approaches are potentially useful because they offer a means of determining which approach
to precontractual reliance is optimal, they are nevertheless flawed in important ways. Most importantly, they fail to resolve fully the salient
question implicit in the precontractual reliance debate: when is a lawsupplied liability rule ever appropriate as an adjunct to express private
contractual arrangements? While the analyses do suggest the benefits of
protecting precontractual reliance, they are fundamentally limited; they
ignore bargaining imperfections and therefore cannot fully rationalize a
rule of law-supplied obligation.
Without a model that includes structural bargaining impediments,
decisionmakers simply cannot select appropriate default rules that would
be preferred by average bargainers to overcome those barriers and solve
recurrent problems, such as opportunism, facing precontractual bargainers. The neglect of such structural barriers also leads such scholars to
place too much faith in private solutions and to suggest unrealistic solutions to the problem of suboptimal investment. Moreover, because these
instrumentalists neglect structural barriers to bargaining, they tend to neglect an important barrier which stems from informational uncertainty.
That neglect leads the commentators to minimize the crucial role reliance
often plays in reducing any putative promisor's uncertainty problems.
That neglect also contributes to the mistaken belief that offers can be formulated in isolation apart from a reliance investment and to an erroneous
calculus for judging the efficiency of reliance-one that is too narrowly
conceived in terms of judging optimal investment with reference to increasing profits on the ultimate transaction. Had the recent instrumentalists addressed the fundamental issues of bargaining impediments, they
385.

See generally Feinman, supra note 12.
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might have fully developed an analytical framework for the justification
of a law-supplied default rule of a performance obligation that would act
as an adjunct to private contractual arrangements. Once articulated, that
framework could prove useful in justifying law-supplied inferred terms in
36
a broad class of cases across a wide range of factual contexts. 1

386. See Kostritsky, supra note 2, at 624 (utilizing such a framework to justify a law-supplied
term of irrevocability in the context of unilateral contracts).

